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A WARRANT REQUIREMENT
RESURGENCE?
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE
ROBERTS COURT
BENJAMIN J. PRIESTER†
INTRODUCTION
Over many years, the United States Supreme Court has
developed an extensive body of precedent interpreting and
enforcing the provisions of the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures by law enforcement agents conducting criminal
investigations. Commonly called the “warrant requirement,” one
key component of this case law operates to deem some police
investigatory techniques to be unconstitutional unless they are
conducted pursuant to a search warrant issued in advance by a
judge. The terms of the doctrine and its exceptions also
authorize other investigatory actions as constitutionally
permissible without a search warrant. The doctrinal framework
created by the warrant requirement serves as a core foundational
principle of the Court’s constitutional criminal procedure for
police investigations.
The conventional wisdom about the warrant requirement
suggests that over the last half-century, the Court has moved
from rigorously interpreting and enforcing the doctrine to
reducing its importance and recognizing more exceptions for
permissible warrantless searches. While this perspective has
some descriptive accuracy in the aggregate, the past decade of
the Roberts Court has produced a series of Fourth Amendment
decisions, ranging across a variety of subsidiary doctrinal areas,
where the warrant requirement has made a comeback—cases in
which a criminal defendant has prevailed because the police
lacked a search warrant when acquiring crucial evidence during
†
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the investigation. A common thread among these decisions is the
Roberts Court’s confrontation of the Fourth Amendment
implications of electronic surveillance, internet connectivity, data
analytics, and other rapidly advancing technologies in the digital
age. This resurgence of the warrant requirement cannot be
readily dismissed as happenstance or coincidence, and
consequently its development and its future ramifications are
worthy of careful consideration.
A.

Doctrinal Foundations

For many years, the warrant requirement has been the
subject of considerable commentary and analysis, both in the
opinions of the Court and among scholars.1 Reviewing the basic
premises of the doctrine is helpful in establishing the framework
for assessing the Court’s recent cases.
Ratified in 1791, the Fourth Amendment accomplished two
important objectives in repudiating certain practices by the
Crown’s agents which, along with many others, had helped to
provoke the American Revolution.2
First, it prohibited
“unreasonable” searches and seizures, ensuring a significant
degree of protection for the security of individuals and their
property against government intrusion.3 Second, it abolished the
general warrants and writs of assistance despised by the
Founders, instead restricting the issuance of warrants to those
supported by an evidentiary basis in probable cause and
circumscribed by particularity in location, target, and subject
matter.4 The relationship between these two clauses of the

1
See David Gray, Fourth Amendment Remedies as Rights: The Warrant
Requirement, 96 B.U. L. REV. 425, 425–36 (2016) (citing and discussing prominent
arguments for and against warrant requirement). See generally Akhil Reed Amar,
Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994); Phyllis T.
Bookspan, Reworking the Warrant Requirement: Resuscitating the Fourth
Amendment, 44 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1991); Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 820 (1994). For a thorough summary of the
current state of the doctrine and its exceptions, see The Warrant Requirement, 46
GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 25 (2017).
2
See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2239–40 (2018) (Thomas,
J., dissenting); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 402 (2014).
3
See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2239–41 (Thomas, J., dissenting); id. at
2243–44 (arguing that, at the time of the Founding, the use of the word
“unreasonable” in the Fourth Amendment “likely meant” to proscribe searches
“against the reason of the common law”); Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482–84.
4
See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2239–40 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Riley, 573
U.S. at 381–83.

2019]

A WARRANT REQUIREMENT RESURGENCE?

91

Fourth Amendment serves as a core underlying issue in debates
over the Court’s warrant requirement doctrine.5
The warrant requirement became prominent during the
1960s and 1970s, when the Court’s decisions rapidly expanded
the doctrinal scope of constitutional criminal procedure.6 In
numerous opinions, the Court has stated the requirement in
these terms: a warrantless search is presumptively unreasonable
in violation of the Fourth Amendment.7 Although the Court in
the same period recognized a variety of situations in which that
presumption could be overcome—such as the presence of exigent
circumstances, the discovery of evidence of a crime in plain view,
or a temporary “stop and frisk” detention short of custodial
arrest8—this doctrinal formulation established an important
procedural distinction for litigating motions to suppress evidence.
When the police discover evidence pursuant to a search warrant,
the burden is on the defendant to prove that the warrant was
constitutionally defective in its issuance or that the police
impermissibly exceeded the scope of search authorization
contained in an otherwise duly issued warrant.9 Neither is easy
to do, but the former is especially difficult.10 On the other hand,
when the police discover evidence without a warrant, the burden
falls on the government to establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that an exception to the warrant requirement applies to

5
See generally JOSHUA DRESSLER, ET AL., 1 UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 10.01 (7th ed. 2017); Gray, supra note 1. See also Groh v. Ramirez,
540 U.S. 551, 571–73 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
6
See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35
WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 204–05 (1993); see infra Part I.B. The expansion reached
well beyond the Fourth Amendment and the warrant requirement. See, e.g.,
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471–72 (1966) (requiring advice of rights and
valid waiver of rights prior to custodial police interrogation); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (requiring representation by counsel at trial for felony
defendants).
7
See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
8
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plain view); Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16, 30 (1968) (stop and frisk); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294,
298–99 (1967) (exigent circumstances and plain view).
9
See, e.g., Groh, 540 U.S. at 561; Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987);
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 156 (1978).
10
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984) (describing four limited
grounds on which defendant may later challenge search warrant); see also Franks,
438 U.S. at 156 (permitting defendant to challenge factual allegations in warrant
affidavit only based on substantial showing of misrepresentation made intentionally,
knowingly, or with reckless disregard for truth); DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 10.04[F]
(discussing challenges based on scope of search authorized by warrant).
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validate the warrantless search.11 Certainly, the label of this
doctrine as a “requirement” for search warrants overstates its
scope; for this reason, describing it as a “preference” for warrants
is probably more accurate.12
Whatever one’s position on the persuasiveness of the various
justifications for, and critiques of, the Court’s warrant
requirement jurisprudence, several fundamental points remain
firmly grounded in the doctrine to this day.
First, the warrant requirement does not apply to any and all
activities of the police in conducting a criminal investigation, but
only to actions which constitute a “search” as defined by the
Court in interpreting the scope of the Fourth Amendment. The
Katz test provides that a “search” occurs when a “reasonable
expectation of privacy” is breached by the police.13 Over the last
half-century, nearly all of the Court’s decisions determining
which investigative techniques are or are not “searches” for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment have applied and interpreted
this doctrine.14 In 2012, however, the Court clarified in Jones v.
United States that a “search” also occurs when the police
physically intrude upon a constitutionally enumerated interest
for the purpose of obtaining information.15
Although the
outcomes created by the Jones trespass test and the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test align in situations of
physical entry or contact,16 the Katz test is broader because it
imposes Fourth Amendment constraints in many scenarios
falling outside the Jones test.17 So long as the Government has

11

See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 & n.14 (1974).
See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 6, at 203.
13
See generally DRESSLER, supra note 5, §§ 6.03–6.04. See also Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967).
14
All of the pertinent “search” cases discussed in Parts II & III, infra, address
the application of the Katz test to the facts before the Court in one or more of the
majority, concurring, or dissenting opinions. See infra Parts II & III. The only case
to discuss exclusively the Jones test, without citing or applying the Katz test, is the
per curiam opinion in Grady v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 1368, 1369–70 (2015)
(holding that attachment of ankle bracelet for post-imprisonment satellite-based
monitoring of sex offender constituted Fourth Amendment “search”).
15
See generally DRESSLER, supra note 5, § 6.03[E]. See also Jones v. United
States, 565 U.S. 400, 404, 406 n.3 (2012).
16
See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013); id. at 13–14 (Kagan, J.,
concurring); Jones, 565 U.S. at 404–05; id. at 413 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at
431 (Alito, J., concurring).
17
See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2211 (2018) (cellphone
location information derived from carrier business records); Kyllo v. United States,
12
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performed a “search” under either test, though, Fourth
Amendment rights—and the warrant requirement—will apply.
Second, the purpose of the warrant requirement is to
facilitate judicial review of police investigative activity.18 As with
the rest of constitutional law, separation of powers principles are
an important safeguard against governmental overreach.19 In
1948, the Court in Johnson v. United States explained the
applicability of judicial review to criminal procedure:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped
by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the
support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those
inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate
instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.20

Third, the framework created by the warrant requirement
determines the timing of when this judicial review will occur.
When the police obtain a search warrant, judicial review occurs
in advance: by approving the application for a search warrant,
the judge validates the search as “reasonable” before any
intrusion into property or privacy takes place.21 When no
warrant exists, judicial review necessarily occurs afterward,
usually through a motion to suppress filed by the criminal
defendant against whom the evidence would be used at trial.22
The Government might prevail against that motion in one of two
533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001) (thermal imager scan of home from street); Katz, 389 U.S at
348 (electronic eavesdropping using microphone attached to exterior of phone booth).
18
See, e.g., Maclin, supra note 6, at 237–38; Benjamin J. Priester, Five Answers
and Three Questions After United States v. Jones (2012), the Fourth Amendment
“GPS Case,” 65 OKLA. L. REV. 491, 512–16 (2013).
19
See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 742 (2008); Clinton v. City of
New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450–53 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
20
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 11, 13–14 (1948).
21
Only in a rare case would a defendant later prevail on a motion to suppress
by arguing that the evidence seized pursuant to an executed search warrant is the
product of a Fourth Amendment violation. See supra note 10. Claims relating to
excessive force to persons or property by law enforcement in executing a valid
warrant must be raised through civil litigation, see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012), not
under the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609,
616 (2007) (per curiam).
22
Challenges to warrantless searches under § 1983 are infrequent, but they do
occur. See, e.g., Valance v. Wisel, 110 F.3d 1269, 1272 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Valance
appeals the district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the six law
enforcement officers he sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . [claiming they had] stopped
his vehicle without probable cause and then detained him for the purpose of
searching the vehicle.” (footnote omitted)).
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situations: either because the investigation properly involved a
“reasonable” warrantless search under a doctrinally recognized
exception to the warrant requirement or because it did not
involve a “search” subject to the Fourth Amendment’s
protections.23 Thus, by combining the significant benefits to the
police from obtaining search warrants with the greater likelihood
that evidence will be excluded from trial when they do not, the
Court’s doctrine intends to provide strong incentives for police to
seek judicial review in advance, rather than after the fact, when
conducting criminal investigations.
B.

The Conventional Wisdom

Though, of course, the reality of the Court’s opinions and the
scholarly commentary is significantly more nuanced, the
conventional wisdom about the warrant requirement and its
history is fairly straightforward. Like any generalization, it has
important inaccuracies, as well as a considerable element of
truth at its core.
This conventional wisdom posits that the warrant
requirement took hold and garnered its greatest force during the
Warren Court and the early Burger Court in the 1960s and
1970s, then suffered substantial undermining and retrenchment
in the Rehnquist Court of the 1980s and 1990s, before reaching
the contemporary Roberts Court shortly after the turn of the
twenty-first century.24 The Court initially enforced the warrant
requirement as the principal protection against unconstitutional
searches, while the Court later placed more emphasis on the
23
If the issue of whether a “search” of the defendant occurred is contested, the
defendant has the burden of establishing that the Fourth Amendment’s protections
were triggered by the pertinent police activity. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
130 n.1 (1978) (“The proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of
establishing that his own Fourth Amendment rights were violated by the challenged
search or seizure.”); see also Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 455 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (“[T]he defendant must bear the burden of proving that . . . a ‘search’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment even took place.”).
24
See, e.g., TINSLEY E. YARBOROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE
CONSTITUTION 220–27 (2000); Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1123, 1125–27, 1131 (1996); Robert M.
Bloom, Warrant Requirement – The Burger Court Approach, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 691
passim (1982); Maclin, supra note 6, at 198–202; Carol S. Steiker, CounterRevolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94
MICH. L. REV. 2466, 2485–86 (1996); George C. Thomas III, Time Travel,
Hovercrafts, and the Framers: James Madison Sees the Future and Rewrites the
Fourth Amendment, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1451, 1457 (2005). John Roberts took
office as Chief Justice in 2005.
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reasonableness requirement.25
As a consequence of this
transformation in analytical approach, the Court showed its
willingness to assess police investigations through a balancing of
interests after the fact rather than relying on procedural hurdles
in advance.26 The Warren Court’s 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohio
made the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applicable not
only in federal court, but also to state law enforcement
investigations and criminal prosecutions.27 Beginning in 1984
with United States v. Leon and accelerating in recent years, later
Courts introduced exceptions to the exclusionary rule to enable
them to uphold convictions even when Fourth Amendment rights
Similarly, the Warren Court’s criminal
were violated.28
procedure cases made extensive use of both direct appeal and
habeas corpus to vindicate constitutional rights, while later
Courts significantly reduced the availability of habeas corpus
review, even before the 1996 statutory amendments.29 Fourth
Amendment cases followed the broader pattern in criminal
procedure as a whole, with the Warren Court’s rulings giving
criminal defendants victory after victory while the Government
frequently prevailed in the Rehnquist Court.30 Under this
conventional wisdom, then, reliance on the warrant requirement

25
See, e.g., Daniel J. Capra, Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence: Fourth and
Fifth Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1267, 1269–70, 1297
(1991); Maclin, supra note 6, at 198–202; Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth
Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV.
383, 386, 392–93 (1988); James F. Tomkovicz, California v. Acevedo: The Walls Close
in on the Warrant Requirement, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1103, 1104 (1992).
26
See, e.g., Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Concept of
Reasonableness, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 1008–10 (2004); Wayne D. Holly, The
Fourth Amendment Hangs in the Balance: Resurrecting the Warrant Requirement
Through Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 536–40 (1997); Maclin,
supra note 6, at 228–47.
27
367 U.S. 643, 659–60 (1961).
28
468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984); see, e.g., Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135,
136–37 (2009); Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 602 (2006); see also Collins v.
Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1675–80 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining
“serious doubts” about constitutional basis for exclusionary rule and arguing that
Court should revisit Mapp).
29
Compare Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398–99 (1963), with Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 91 (1977); see also, e.g., McClesky v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 496–97 (1991);
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308, 310 (1989); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493–94
(1976). Major amendments were enacted in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). See Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012)).
30
See generally YARBOROUGH, supra note 24, at 215–42.
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as a means of protecting Fourth Amendment rights has been on
the decline for nearly forty years.
In that regard, criminal procedure and the Fourth
Amendment are little different than the broader span of
constitutional law. As the Court in the later twentieth century
shifted from consistent liberal majorities to consistent
conservative ones, it was not unexpected that later decisions
would reshape doctrinal principles governing search and seizure
or Miranda rights31 as much as case law relating to
unenumerated privacy rights, affirmative action, or economic
regulation under the Commerce Clause.32 This mirrors the early
twentieth-century shift from conservative majorities to liberal
ones that led to contraction or repudiation of precedent on
similar issues of national concern.33 At the same time, these
high-level generalities are useful only as far as they go, and
prominent counterexamples are not hard to find in criminal
procedure as with any other doctrinal area. Most prominently,
perhaps, the defendant-favorable Warren Court also decided
Terry v. Ohio, promulgating the “stop and frisk” authority that is
arguably the largest—and most abused—grant of discretion to
police anywhere in Fourth Amendment case law.34
At a general level, the conventional wisdom has some utility
as a rule of thumb in thinking about the path of the Court’s
decisionmaking. While overall trends in the doctrine might not
predict the outcome of any particular case to reach the Court,
they provide a sense of the norms and values guiding the Court’s
decisions. Ultimately, the conventional wisdom reflects the
broad consensus from participants and observers about the
aggregate direction taken by the Court over time.

31
See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 389 (2010); United States v.
Patane, 542 U.S. 630. 636–37 (2004); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985);
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302–03 (1980).
32
See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567–68 (1995); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833, 874 (1992).
33
See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954); West Coast
Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 517
(1934); BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 3–7 (1998).
34
See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan, Terry’s Original Sin, 2016 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 66
(2016); David A. Harris, Factors for Reasonable Suspicion: When Black and Poor
Means Stopped and Frisked, 69 IND. L.J. 659, 659–60, 677 (1994); Carol S. Steiker,
Terry Unbound, 82 MISS. L.J. 329, 332–33 (2013).
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And that conventional wisdom suggests that the Roberts
Court, building on the decisions of the Rehnquist Court that
preceded it, would continue to limit the warrant requirement, to
expand the reasonableness analysis, and to generally favor the
Government rather than defendants in interpreting the scope of
Fourth Amendment rights. Over the past decade, however, the
Roberts Court has departed from this expectation in several
significant ways. The unexpected resurgence of the warrant
requirement in the Roberts Court deserves careful evaluation.
I.

THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT RESURGENCE

The Fourth Amendment enumerates “persons, houses,
papers, and effects” as the constitutionally protected interests
secured “against unreasonable searches” carried out by the police
or other governmental actors.35 Consequently, those interests
long have served as the focus of the Court’s analysis in
interpreting the warrant requirement and related doctrinal
principles. In the Roberts Court’s decisions, these interests
likewise have served as the primary—but not exclusive—source
of the resurgence in the warrant requirement.
A.

Houses and Curtilage

The principle that homes deserve an especially strong degree
of protection against governmental intrusion has deep roots in
the common law.36 The aphorism that a man’s home is his castle
reflects not only the preservation of property rights, including the
power to exclude, but also the sanctity of the intimate details of
private life held within.37
Even the much-ignored Third
Amendment signifies the importance of keeping government
agents out of private homes, except for the most justifiable of
reasons.38 And this principle applies not only to the interior of

35
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (1791). Like other areas of constitutional law, the
Fourth Amendment only applies to state action, including informants or other
individuals acting in cooperation with the police, but not to the actions of
independent private parties. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115
(1984) (private inspection followed by police search).
36
See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2013); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
37
See, e.g., Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 (2006); Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998).
38
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.5 (1967).
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the home contained within its walls but also to the outdoor
curtilage immediately adjacent to the physical structure.39
It is fitting, then, that the Court has long insisted that a
warrant is presumptively required to authorize constitutionally
permissible police entry of a home. When the police have
probable cause to arrest a suspect, they nevertheless must obtain
an arrest warrant before entering his home to arrest him.40
Likewise, when the police have probable cause that evidence of
crime is present in a residence, a search warrant—circumscribed
by particularity as to the evidence expected to be discovered and
seized—is required to authorize entry to obtain it.41 The Court’s
“knock and announce” decisions further protect the interests in
property and privacy during the execution of warrants by
requiring the police to give the resident an opportunity to admit
the police by their own action and to avoid forcible entry.42 Thus,
the heightened protection for the home is secured by requiring
judicial review in advance of entry, helping to ensure that the
intrusion by the police is sufficiently justified and limited.
Concomitantly, the Court has narrowly defined the
situations in which that presumption can be overcome to justify a
warrantless entry. Police acting in immediate “hot pursuit” of a
felony suspect who flees into a home are not required to abandon
their chase and to secure the scene from the outside while
obtaining a warrant, thereby risking the suspect getting away or
harming innocent persons inside.43
The same principle of
impracticability authorizes warrantless entries of homes by the
police acting as community caretakers, such as intervening to
avoid potential harm by an individual who poses a danger to
himself or to others44 or to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence that would be gone by the time the police would be able
to make entry with a duly obtained warrant.45 Finally, the
39

See, e.g., Jardines, 569 U.S. at 6–7.
See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980).
41
See, e.g., Brigham City, Utah v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); Groh v.
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004); Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31.
42
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520
U.S. 385, 387 (1997) (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995)).
43
See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976); Warden, Md.
Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967). But see Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740, 754 (1984) (rejecting warrantless entry of home to pursue driver involved
in misdemeanor traffic offense).
44
See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 49 (2009) (per curiam); Stuart, 547 U.S.
at 403–04.
45
See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460, 460 n.3 (2011).
40
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requirement of a warrant to enter and search a home is overcome
when a resident with common authority over the premises gives
voluntary consent to the police, but only so long as that consent
is neither withdrawn by that resident nor vitiated by another
resident who is present and objects.46 When an entry is based on
exigent circumstances or consent, the Court has determined that
judicial review after the fact is adequate to preserve the
resident’s interests.
On the other hand, longstanding doctrine emphasizes an
important distinction between physical entry to the home or
curtilage and visual observation of those spaces from a lawful
vantage point beyond the curtilage. An officer standing on the
street or sidewalk, for example, might be able to see an object
resting on a table on a front porch, to see the identifying features
of a vehicle parked in an open garage, or to hear a loud noise
emanating from behind a closed door or a shaded window.47 Such
observations would not require a warrant because they do not
constitute a “search” governed by the Fourth Amendment in the
first instance.48 Thus, police may conduct such investigative
activity on their own initiative, subject to judicial review
afterward to confirm that the observations were performed in a
permissible manner.
This lawful vantage point doctrine became the vector by
which the Court confronted the use of technology to conduct
observations of the home or curtilage. Although human beings
are not capable of unassisted flight, the Court held in two cases
decided in 1986 and 1989 that aerial observation of the curtilage
from an airplane or helicopter qualified as a permissible
warrantless observation from a lawful vantage point, including
the use of an ordinary camera to take photographs of the
property.49 No single line of reasoning garnered support from a

46
See Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298–301 (2014) (interpreting and
applying Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 107, 111, 122–23 (2006)); United States
v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177–78 (1974)).
47
Compare, e.g., Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1670–71 (2018); id. at 1681
(Alito, J., dissenting), and Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6 (2013); id. at 13–15
(Kagan, J., concurring), with Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 43–44 (2001)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
48
See, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 32.
49
See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448–49 (1989) (observation from helicopter
at altitude of 400 feet with the naked eye); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209,
215 (1986) (observation from airplane at altitude of 1000 feet and photographs taken
“with a standard 35mm camera”).

100

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:89

majority of the Court in these cases.50 The underlying analogy,
however, is conceptually sound: areas of curtilage which might be
obstructed from ground-level observation can be viewed by a
variety of historically available unsophisticated methods, such as
climbing a tree or perching atop the roof of a nearby building.
Consequently, the police use of relatively mundane modern
technology to obtain such views by aircraft is comparable enough
to justify the same doctrinal result under the reasonable
expectation of privacy analysis.
By contrast, the Court held in 1984 that the use of a radiotransmitter beeper to verify the presence of certain specific
canisters of ether inside a particular residence could not be
justified by this same reasoning.51 Rather, the use of the radio
receiver from beyond the curtilage provided information the
police could not otherwise have obtained from any lawful vantage
point, and, thus, the police conducted a Fourth Amendment
“search” by using the device to locate the canisters inside the
home.52
In the absence of a warrant for that electronic
surveillance of the contents of the home’s interior, the search was
an unconstitutional intrusion into the resident’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.53
In 2001, the Court in Kyllo v. United States confronted a far
more advanced device deployed to investigate a home: a thermal
imager displaying heat differentials—the kind of infrared vision
previously available only to fictional superheroes and some
nonhuman animal species.54 In defending the use of the imager
by the police without first obtaining a warrant, the Government
noted the agents’ presence in a concededly lawful vantage point
across the street from the home at the time they activated the
device.55 But the Court rejected the significance of that viewing
position and focused instead on the nature of the police
interaction with the home.56
A breach of the resident’s
reasonable expectation of privacy occurred because the police
made a constructive entry into the home by using senseenhancing technology to obtain information about the interior of
50
Ciraolo was decided 5-4 and Riley was decided 4-1-4. See also Priester, supra
note 18, at 521.
51
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 706 (1984).
52
Id. at 714–16.
53
Id. at 717–18.
54
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29–30, 35–36, 36 n.3 (2001).
55
Id. at 33–35; id. at 45, 48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
56
Id. at 36–37, 40 (majority opinion).
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the home that otherwise could only have been known by
physically entering the home.57 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion
emphasized that such a conclusion was necessary to ensure that
homes retained the same degree of protection against
governmental inspection as had been secured by the Framers in
adopting the Fourth Amendment.58 At the same time, the
opinion noted that if the sense-enhancing technology is in
“general public use”—not further defined by the Kyllo
Court—then a reasonable expectation of privacy is not breached;
such observations would be anticipated, if not routine, in
everyday life, whereas the use of nonpublic technology by the
police constitutes an irregular or unusual observation of the
home that residents cannot be deemed to have anticipated.59
Thus, Kyllo confirmed that the police do not need a warrant to
make observations of a home or curtilage from a lawful vantage
point using their ordinary senses or ordinary electronic
devices—but once technological enhancement further expands
the information available to the police, the constitutional
calculus changes.
The Roberts Court has reaffirmed these core principles,
enforcing the Fourth Amendment’s protections against both
physical and constructive entries to the home and curtilage. In
doing so, the Court has protected the home and the curtilage
against investigations that would be constitutionally permissible
in public spaces, while laying the foundation for the important
distinction between traditional physical inspections and
technological surveillance that would guide its decisions beyond
this limited context.
In 2013, the Court in Florida v. Jardines considered the
implications of using a canine sniff from a trained drug-detection
dog to determine the presence of illegal narcotics inside a home.60
Prior decisions in 1983 and 2005 had held that canine sniffs of
airport luggage and of motor vehicles on public roadways did not
constitute a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes and thus
could be performed as part of a preliminary police investigation
without the need for any individual suspicion of the subject

57
58
59
60

Id. at 34, 40.
Id. at 31, 34.
See id. at 34, 40.
See Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 3–4 (2013).
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property, much less a search warrant.61 The Court based this
rule primarily on the unique binary nature of the organic
technology: a canine sniff can only determine the presence or the
absence of contraband.62 In Jardines, the Government relied on
that rationale to argue that the canine sniff of a home also should
not constitute a “search” because it likewise would not reveal any
private or intimate details of the home, just like the luggage or
the car, but only the presence of contraband.63 The Court
rejected this argument, however, and held that a canine sniff of a
home requires probable cause and a warrant.64 The majority
opinion by Justice Scalia relied on the agent’s physical entry into
the curtilage—the agent and the dog stood on the home’s front
porch—for the purpose of enabling the dog to sniff from a position
immediately adjacent to the front door, constituting a “search”
under the terms of the Jones trespass test.65 The concurring
opinion explained that the same result applied under the
reasonable expectation of privacy test as elaborated in Kyllo,
emphasizing that narcotics-detection dogs are not in “general
public use”—and certainly not for the purpose of obtaining
information about the interior contents of residences.66 Thus,
although the Court’s precedent gives the police considerable
leeway to use canine sniffs to find drugs in public spaces, the
heightened protection applicable to homes and curtilage
supersedes this authority.
The 2018 decision in Collins v. Virginia reiterated this
principle in the context of a physical search of a motorcycle.67 As
discussed below, numerous prior cases had upheld warrantless
searches of motor vehicles under the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement, so long as the police had probable cause
that evidence of crime was present.68 In Collins, the police
located a motorcycle with probable cause to connect it to several
prior incidents; an officer removed its tarp covering,
photographed the motorcycle, and confirmed that its license plate
61
See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
62
See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409–10; Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
63
See Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 at 10.
64
Id. at 10–12.
65
See id. at 5–10.
66
Id. at 11; see also id. at 14–15 (Kagan, J., concurring).
67
See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1671 (2018).
68
See infra note 99 and accompanying text; see also Collins, 138 S. Ct.
at 1669–70.

2019]

A WARRANT REQUIREMENT RESURGENCE?

103

and vehicle identification number matched a stolen vehicle.69 All
of this would have been perfectly permissible under the
automobile exception70—but when the officer performed the
inspection, the motorcycle was parked in an open carport at the
top of a driveway immediately adjacent to a home where the
defendant possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy.71 As in
Jardines, the Court in Collins held that the officer’s physical
intrusion into the home’s curtilage for the purpose of obtaining
information for the police investigation constituted a “search” for
Fourth Amendment purposes.72 Consequently, even though the
warrantless search of the vehicle itself would have been
independently valid, the separate and distinct search of the
curtilage was unconstitutional because it was not conducted
pursuant to a search warrant.
The Court’s controversial 2011 decision in Kentucky v. King
authorized a warrantless physical entry into a home based on the
exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement even
in the context of a “police-created exigency” situation.73 In that
case, the police had probable cause that illegal narcotics were
present inside an apartment—but also believed that the
individuals inside were unaware of either the officers’ presence or
the officers’ knowledge.74 Based on those facts, Justice Ginsburg
agreed with the defendant that exigent circumstances did not
exist: the police had plenty of time to obtain a warrant before
entering the apartment to search for and seize the drugs.75
Instead, however, the officers relied upon their longstanding
“knock and talk” authority to pound on the apartment door, to
declare their presence, and to seek cooperation from the
residents.76 The individuals inside reacted by shouting and
moving furniture, giving the officers additional probable cause:
69
Collins, 138 S.Ct. at 1668–69; see also id. at 1671 n.2; id. at 1681 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
70
See id. at 1681–82 (Alito, J., dissenting).
71
See id. at 1670–71 (majority opinion). The state did not contest Collins’ right
to assert Fourth Amendment interests in the home because “[his] girlfriend lived in
the house and . . . [he] stayed there a few nights per week.” Id. at 1668 & n.1.
72
See id. at 1670–73. The officer “not only invaded Collins’ Fourth Amendment
interest in the item searched, i.e., the motorcycle, but also invaded Collins’ Fourth
Amendment interest in the curtilage of his home.” Id. at 1671.
73
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455, 461–62 (2011).
74
Id. at 455–57.
75
Id. at 476–77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76
Id. at 456, 462 n.4, 472; see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 21–22 (2013)
(Alito, J., dissenting) (describing “knock and talk” by police).
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the belief that the destruction of the drugs was imminent to
avoid their discovery by the police.77 The eight-justice majority
ruled that, on these facts, the exigent circumstances exception
obviated the need for a warrant prior to entry of the apartment to
secure the evidence before its disappearance.78 In essence, the
Court determined that, although the police had created the
opportunity for the exigency to arise, the existence of the exigency
was entirely under the control of the individuals inside the
apartment: had they simply remained calm in reaction to the
provocative incitement of the “knock and talk,” the officers would
have been unable to assert a belief that any imminent
destruction of evidence was probable.79 Viewed another way,
although action by the police was a but-for cause of the exigency,
its proximate cause was the reaction of the individuals inside.80
Just as the police may hope to rely on a resident’s ignorance of
his rights to obtain consent to search the premises,81 so too the
police may choose to take the calculated risk that revealing their
presence may or may not induce a reaction that justifies
immediate warrantless entry. Thus, although Kentucky v. King
provides significant authority for warrantless entries to homes at
the inducement of the police, the Court believed that its holding
leaves control of the heightened Fourth Amendment protection
for the home in the hands of the residents.
B.

Persons

One might expect to see a long line of cases from the Court
affirming that freedom from physical inspection or bodily
intrusion of the person deserves equally strong protection as
physical entry into the home or its curtilage and therefore
enforcing the warrant requirement with significant rigor as to
person as well as houses.
Little such precedent exists,
however—likely because the Government has rarely pressed a

77

King, 563 U.S. at 456, 471–72.
See id. at 469–72.
79
See id. at 457–58.
80
“Occupants who choose not to stand on their constitutional rights but instead
elect to attempt to destroy evidence have only themselves to blame for the
warrantless exigent-circumstances search that may ensue.” Id. at 470.
81
See United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 199–201 (2002) (consent to search
of person and luggage on passenger bus); Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 35 (1996)
(consent to search of automobile).
78
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contrary argument in a criminal case in a manner that could
reach the Court on discretionary review.82
Instead, the Court’s cases establish a variety of scenarios in
which the police are uncontestably performing a “search” of the
person, but where that search is constitutionally reasonable
without a warrant. When an individual has been lawfully
arrested with probable cause, the arresting officer may inspect
the person, his clothing, and any containers or objects found on
him.83 This immediate, warrantless search is justified by the
twin interests of protecting the officer from possible ambush by
concealed weapons or dangerous items and securing any
destructible evidence in the arrestee’s possession—and by the
principle of impracticability, because those interests would be
thwarted by the delay attendant to obtaining a search warrant.84
Similarly, the exterior pat down of clothing carried out as part of
a Terry stop-and-frisk protects the officer from potential attack
by an armed and dangerous individual during a temporary
investigative detention that is even shorter in duration and less
secure than a custodial arrest, making warrants even more
impracticable in that context.85 Even in the more controlled
setting of the police station, certain warrantless searches of the
person are reasonable. If the arrestee is to be held in custody in
jail, a full-body strip search of the person is permissible before
introduction into the inmate population.86 A cotton swab may be
82
For example, in Grady v. North Carolina, the Court addressed the use of an
ankle bracelet GPS tracking device to monitor the location of a recidivist sex
offender after release from incarceration, but only for the limited purpose of
confirming that such a post-conviction program constitutes a “search” subject to
Fourth Amendment analysis even when it is civil in nature. See 135 S. Ct. 1368,
1370–71 (2015) (per curiam). The Court has ruled that certain searches of the person
violate the Fourth Amendment in § 1983 cases as well. See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 368, 378–79 (2009) (holding that, notwithstanding
school officials’ extensive authority and discretion, a strip search of a middle school
student suspected of possessing and distributing ibuprofen in violation of school
rules was an unreasonable violation of the Fourth Amendment); Ferguson v. City of
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 79–86 (2001) (holding that involuntary drug testing of
pregnant mothers in a public hospital did not qualify as a “special needs” search and
thus was an unreasonable violation of the Fourth Amendment without a warrant
and probable cause).
83
See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
84
See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338–39 (2009).
85
See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 23–31 (1968); see also, e.g., Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993) (applying limited scope of permissible Terry
frisk).
86
See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Burlington, 566 U.S. 318, 334,
338–39 (2012).
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inserted into the mouth to obtain a saliva sample for DNA
identification purposes,87 and a DUI arrestee may be compelled to
exhale air into a breathalyzer device to confirm blood-alcohol
content (“BAC”).88 In each of these situations, the Court is
satisfied with judicial review of the bodily search after the fact in
a motion to suppress.
Yet, the Roberts Court has found occasion to reinvigorate the
warrant requirement for searches of the person in light of recent
technological advancements.
In 1966, the Court held in
Schmerber v. California that a police officer could obtain a
warrantless blood draw by a medical professional to establish
BAC in a drunk driving investigation, reasoning that the
reliability of the BAC calculation would be compromised by the
delay caused by waiting for a search warrant, thereby creating
exigent circumstances to secure the evidence immediately before
its degradation.89
Relying on this decision, some states
statutorily authorized police to obtain compelled blood draws
from DUI arrestees.90 In a pair of decisions in 2013 and 2016, the
Court ruled these statutes unconstitutional as applied to most
DUI arrests and sharply narrowed the exigency rationale for DUI
blood draws.91 The Court repudiated neither the scientific
rationale—it remains true today that the body’s natural
metabolism degrades BAC over time—nor the inherent presence
of probable cause to justify confirming BAC that comes with any
lawful drunk driving arrest.92 Instead, the Court emphasized
that the processing time in obtaining warrants has decreased
substantially over the half-century since Schmerber, mooting the
exigency concerns under most circumstances.93
In particular, the Court reasoned in both Missouri v.
McNeely and Birchfield v. North Dakota that today’s readily
available technology means that it is no longer necessary for
either an officer to physically visit the courthouse to file tangible
paperwork or a judge to be physically present in the courthouse
building to review it for a search warrant to be issued.94 Rules of
87

See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 465–66 (2013).
See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176–78, 2184–85 (2016).
89
384 U.S. 757, 770–72 (1966).
90
See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 160–61 (2013).
91
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185–86; McNeely, 569 U.S. at 160–63, 165.
92
See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2174; McNeely, 569 U.S. at 151–52.
93
See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154–55.
94
See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2192–93 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154–55.
88
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procedure have been amended to allow police officers to submit
warrant applications electronically from the field, such as from
Wi-Fi-enabled laptops in patrol cars, and for judges to approve
them electronically in a matter of minutes, including from a
home computer—or perhaps even a smartphone.95 This ready
availability of electronic warrants has dramatically reduced the
delay involved in waiting to obtain judicial review in advance of
the search; a process that might have taken hours now can occur
in a matter of minutes, especially if an on-call judge is assigned
to review electronic requests promptly at any hour of the day or
night.96
Accordingly, the Court refused to allow statutory
authority to remain premised on obsolete assessments of delay
and exigency, holding that a warrantless DUI blood draw to
confirm BAC is constitutionally permissible only based on a
fact-specific showing of impracticability in obtaining an electronic
warrant expeditiously in the context of a particular arrest.97
Although the search of the person involved in McNeely and
Birchfield is an especially intrusive one—a medical procedure to
pierce the skin and withdraw blood—the Court’s reasoning about
the speed at which warrants can now be obtained has the
potential to resonate in the analysis of any exception to the
warrant requirement based on principles of impracticability.
C.

Effects

The recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement
authorize a wide variety of warrantless searches of personal
effects. Searches incident to arrest encompass not only the
warrantless seizure of physical objects found on the person, but
also subsequent warrantless inspection to determine what has
been found, such as laboratory testing to confirm the presence of
illegal narcotics.98 When the police have probable cause, the
automobile exception similarly permits both the warrantless
seizure of a motor vehicle and the warrantless search of
95

See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154–55.
See McNeely, 569 U.S. at 154–55, 164.
97
See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2184, 2186; McNeely, 569 U.S. at 156, 164. The
dissent in Birchfield argued that the same reasoning should require a search
warrant for a BAC breath test as well. See 136 S. Ct. at 2195–96 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
98
See, e.g., Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 336 (2009) (bag of cocaine found in
pocket of jacket in back seat of car after driver’s arrest for traffic offense); United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1973) (heroin capsules found in cigarette
carton in shirt pocket of driver arrested for traffic offense).
96
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anywhere within the vehicle where the evidence sought could be
found, including storage spaces in the car like the trunk or glove
compartment, as well as personal effects found inside the car,
such as a purse or bag.99 Personal property in police custody
arriving at the police station, such as during booking of an
arrestee or impoundment of a car, is subject to an inventory
search using the department’s established standardized
protocols.100 And a person may give voluntary consent to allow
the police to inspect his property even if the police can articulate
no individualized suspicion for requesting cooperation from
him.101 Thus, tangible personal property as a category receives
less rigorous Fourth Amendment protection than homes or
persons.102
On the other hand, authority to search personal effects is not
unrestricted, and the police must take care to ensure that a valid
exception to the warrant requirement applies. In 1977, the Court
considered the somewhat remarkable facts of United States v.
Chadwick.103 FBI agents had clear probable cause from a canine
sniff that the defendants’ footlocker contained illegal narcotics;
after the defendants loaded the footlocker into the trunk of a car
but before they drove away, the agents arrested them and seized
the footlocker, which was opened several hours later at the FBI
office without a warrant.104 The Court explained why, on the
facts, the agents could not rely upon exigent circumstances, the
automobile exception, search incident to arrest, inventory search,
or consent to overcome the need for a search warrant—and,
therefore, the marijuana inside the footlocker had been found in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.105 The 2000 decision in
Bond v. United States reaffirmed this principle.106 While lawfully
interacting with bus passengers at a valid immigration
checkpoint near the border with Mexico, an agent reached up to
99
See Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 298 (1999) (purse on back seat); see
also California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 567 (1991) (paper bag in trunk).
100
See Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990); see also Illinois v. Lafayette, 462
U.S. 640, 648 (1983); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976).
101
See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200–01 (2002).
102
Where the nature of an object as a dangerous weapon or criminal evidence is
“immediately apparent,” the police may seize it on the spot without a warrant to
secure its later use against the individual. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 375 (1993); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990).
103
433 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1977).
104
Id.
105
See id. at 5–6, 11, 13, 14–15.
106
529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000).
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the overhead storage space and squeezed a soft-sided duffel bag
belonging to the defendant.107
The Court rejected the
Government’s position that the agent’s action was routine,
incidental contact, which the defendant necessarily accepted
while traveling on a passenger bus and instead ruled that the
agent’s exploratory manipulation of the bag exceeded the
permissible bounds of interaction between fellow travelers and
therefore breached his reasonable expectation of privacy on the
facts without any applicable exception to the warrant
requirement.108
The Jones decision in 2012 extended this principle, holding
that a physical trespass upon the defendant’s motor vehicle for
the purpose of obtaining information—specifically, the
attachment of a GPS device which electronically transmitted its
coordinates at frequent intervals to create an ongoing log of its
location—constituted a search of the vehicle requiring a
warrant.109 The majority opinion reached this conclusion even
though the information ultimately sought by the Government
involved electronic data points about the vehicle’s public
movements over time rather than the nature of its physical
contents, unlike the interior inspections of containers in
Chadwick and Bond or the canine sniff of the automobile in
Illinois v. Caballes.110 One important limitation governs the
Fourth Amendment protection of effects: the challenged search
must relate to the defendant’s own personal effects.
For
example, discarded or abandoned property no longer carries any
reasonable expectation of privacy, so a defendant could not claim
Fourth Amendment protection against police inspection of his
curbside trash left out for pickup.111 Similarly, the Court held
that a temporary passenger in a car cannot assert a reasonable
expectation of privacy against police search of the vehicle unless
the individual can establish some ownership or possessory

107

Id. at 335–36.
Id. at 338–39.
109
See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012). The Government
had obtained a warrant but failed to execute it in compliance with its terms; for the
purposes of its decision, the Court treated the case as involving warrantless GPS
surveillance. Id. at 402–03, 403 n.1.
110
Id. at 408–09; see also id. at 430–31 (Alito, J., concurring) (reaching same
conclusion under Katz test).
111
See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988).
108
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interest in either the vehicle itself or the items discovered during
the search.112
The 2018 decision in Byrd v. United States, however,
indicates that the Roberts Court follows a functional approach to
this doctrine rather than a formalistic one.113 In that case, the
defendant’s acquaintance obtained a rental car on his behalf,
apparently because he knew that his criminal record would cause
him to be rejected, and the defendant’s driving of the vehicle
indisputably violated the terms of the rental contract as executed
by the acquaintance.114 The Government claimed that the
defendant therefore lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy
in the vehicle and could not object to the search of the trunk that
uncovered body armor and a considerable quantity of illegal
narcotics, but the Court unanimously rejected that argument.115
Instead, the Court ruled that the breach of contract alone was
insufficient to abrogate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights, particularly because his right to possess, control, and
exclude others from the car was nevertheless superior to anyone
else’s.116 Although the Court remanded for a determination of
whether the search might be upheld on some other basis, the
emphasis on a pragmatic rather than technical interpretation of
the definition of “his” effects for Fourth Amendment purposes is
doctrinally significant.117

112
See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978). In Rakas, the defendants
disclaimed ownership of the items seized as evidence, which were later connected to
them anyway. Id. at 130–31, 148. In Wyoming v. Houghton, by contrast, a car
passenger undeniably had a reasonable expectation of privacy in her own purse, but
the warrantless search of her purse was constitutional as part of an overall search of
the car under the automobile exception. 526 U.S. 295, 298, 300, 307 (1999). The
Court has recognized that guests in homes possess broader reasonable expectation of
privacy interests. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Minnesota v.
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 98–99 (1990).
113
138 S. Ct. 1518, 1530–31 (2018).
114
Id. at 1524, 1529–30.
115
Id. at 1525, 1527; see also id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 1531–32
(Alito, J., concurring).
116
Id. at 1527–29 (majority opinion).
117
See id. at 1526–27, 1530; see also id. at 1531 (Thomas, J., concurring). The
Court noted that, on remand, the lower courts could consider whether on these facts
the defendant should be treated as equivalent to a wrongful possessor like a thief, as
well as whether the police had probable cause to lawfully search the car without a
warrant in any event under the automobile exception. See id. at 1529–31 (majority
opinion); id. at 1532 (Alito, J., concurring).
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D. Papers
The protection against unreasonable searches or seizures of
papers has the same limitation: only the person whose papers
were seized or searched has a Fourth Amendment interest to
assert. Under the “third party doctrine” component of the Katz
analysis, an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy
in business records created or maintained by companies with
which they interact.118 Thus, no “search” for Fourth Amendment
purposes occurs, and neither individualized suspicion nor a
warrant is required, when the police obtain bank records, phone
company dialing records, or billing records relating to a
customer.119 Even in a case where agents acting without a
warrant brazenly absconded with a bank vice president’s
briefcase and successfully copied the papers inside before he
returned from dinner none the wiser, the Court held that the
bank customer whose records had been obtained in the raid
nevertheless could not suppress those papers from his criminal
trial, because only the vice president’s Fourth Amendment rights
had been violated, not the customer’s own personal rights.120
In some cases, of course, the defendant’s own papers will be
at issue. As with bodily searches of persons, the Court has few
contemporary decisions in which the importance of the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement to inspections of papers by the
police is a noteworthy aspect of a doctrinal holding.121 As with
searches of effects, recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement provide a number of contexts in which the police
would incidentally acquire, and observe the contents of, various
writings, such as the exterior notation on an envelope discovered
in plain view during a search of a car or a handwritten list found
118

See Priester, supra note 18, at 525–26.
See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (1979) (phone company dialing
records for individual customer); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 446 (1976)
(bank account records for individual customer); Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 52–54 (1974) (bank business records required pursuant to Bank Secrecy
Act).
120
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 735 (1980).
121
The Court has addressed governmental investigation into papers more
frequently under the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See, e.g.,
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 29–30, 34 (2000) (grand jury subpoena for
business records also implicating personal criminal liability of recipient); United
States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 606–07 (1984) (grand jury subpoena for sole
proprietorship business records); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 394, 396
(1976) (IRS summons for taxpayer documents); see also infra note 195 (discussing
Fourth Amendment implications for subpoenas after Carpenter).
119
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in the pocket of an arrestee.122 On the other hand, when the
police specifically set out to locate and take custody of a person’s
documents with the objective of performing a thorough
evidentiary search for written evidence of crime contained
therein, the Court presumably has assumed that the police and
the lower courts understood that a search warrant is required
both to seize and to read and analyze such papers as part of a
police investigation.123
For that reason, the Court’s 2014 decision in Riley v.
California is profoundly significant in declaring that the warrant
requirement applies to evidentiary searches of digital data
contained on electronic devices the police have lawfully seized.124
The defendants in Riley had been lawfully arrested and brought
to the police station, where the police had lawful custody of the
smartphones removed from their persons incident to the
arrests.125
Without obtaining search warrants, the police
conducted inspections of the digital data on the phones—
including phone numbers, contacts lists, text messages, and
photographs—which resulted in the discovery of evidence used to
convict the defendants.126 The Government sought to defend the
inspections as a valid warrantless search incident to arrest;
although the Court agreed that inspection of physical objects
found on the person should remain permissible, it rejected the
applicability of that exception to the warrant requirement for
Accordingly, the Court overturned the
digital data.127
convictions, ruling that the evidence obtained from the

122
See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 455–56 (1980) (stating that an
officer conducting traffic stop observed “on the floor of the car an envelope marked
‘Supergold’ that he associated with marihuana” and, after arresting the car’s
occupants, “picked up the envelope marked ‘Supergold’ and found that it contained
marihuana”). “It has long been accepted that written items found on the person of an
arrestee may be examined and used at trial.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 405 &
n.* (2014) (Alito, J., concurring) (citing authorities).
123
Different principles apply when government investigators seek to inspect
papers for administrative or regulatory purposes, rather than as part of a criminal
investigation. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015).
Grand jury subpoenas have also traditionally been subject to different Fourth
Amendment analysis than investigative action by the police has been. See infra note
195.
124
See 573 U.S. 373, 403.
125
See id. at 378–81.
126
See id.
127
See id. at 386.
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warrantless search of the phones’ digital data should have been
suppressed under the exclusionary rule.128
Most importantly, the Riley Court emphasized that the
digital data contained on electronic devices is both quantitatively
and qualitatively different than information revealed by physical
objects, including traditional papers.129 The vast data-storage
capacities of today’s handheld devices—not to mention
information stored in “the cloud” and equally accessible from an
internet-enabled device—is orders of magnitude larger than what
any person could have physically carried with them in a purse,
briefcase, or even a duffel bag or rolling luggage.130 Likewise,
much of this data is highly personal in nature—from medical
information and religious or political affiliation to intensely
private intimate details of a person’s life—and was never carried
around as a matter of course in everyday life in earlier times.131
Taken together, the information revealed by an evidentiary
search of digital data on smartphones and similar devices simply
is not analogous to the inspection of physical objects.132 Thus, the
Court recognized that doctrinal principles grounded in the
practical realities of the common law, and even the analog
modern period, cannot be transposed by rote to digital data in the
internet age.
E.

“Surveillance” in the Analog Age: Eavesdropping and
Location Tracking

From the ratification of the Constitution to today, federal
criminal law enforcement has always been a small fraction of the
overall criminal justice system in the United States, even during
the heights of alcohol Prohibition in the 1920s and the “war on
drugs” in the 1980s.133 Consequently, prior to Mapp in 1961, the
128
See id. at 403. For one defendant, the Court affirmed the reversal of the
conviction by the lower court. See id.
129
See id. at 393–94.
130
See id. at 393–95.
131
See id. at 395–97.
132
See id. at 386, 397.
133
Compare Total Incoming Criminal Caseloads Reported by State Courts, All
States, 2007-2016, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, http://www.courtstatistics.org/~/
media/Microsites/Files/CSP/Criminal/PDFs/EWSC-2016-CRIM-Page-1-Trend.ashx
(last visited May 16, 2019) (reporting 17.8 million incoming state criminal cases in
2016), with Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2016, UNITED STATES COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/federal-judicial-caseload-statistics-2016
(last visited May 16, 2019) (reporting 79,787 filings for criminal defendants in
federal district courts in 2016).
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Court had decided a comparatively small number of
constitutional criminal procedure cases, although some
contemporary doctrines have their roots in that period.134 After
the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment and the exclusionary
rule to the states, though, the Court began to review
investigations conducted not only by highly trained and
well-funded federal agencies like the FBI, but also all manner of
state and local law enforcement around the country, including
some plagued by incompetence, vindictiveness, or racism in
addition to less sophistication in best practices or legal
obligations.135 It is not surprising, then, that this exposure to the
reality of law enforcement in the United States led the Court to
seek to ensure judicial review of a broader scope of police
investigations than it historically had required.
One vector in this transformation occurred in the Court’s
definition of what kinds of police surveillance activity constitute
a “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes.
Until the
mid-twentieth century, the police necessarily conducted
investigations by using their natural senses to make observations
of physical places and tangible evidence because little else was
technologically possible. When police began to make use of
electronic eavesdropping, such as microphones and wiretaps, to
investigate suspects, the Court initially retained its existing
doctrine, holding that no “search” occurred unless the police
physically entered a constitutionally protected area such as a
home or office.136 For example, the Court held that police needed
probable cause and a warrant to deploy a “spike mike” that
physically penetrated into a wall of a house, but not to install a
wiretap that intruded into a phone line at a position on the street
where the homeowner had no property interest in the phone
company’s hardware.137 The scope of an individual’s Fourth
134
See generally, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) (warrantless
search incident to arrest); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (warrantless
searches of automobiles); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (exclusionary
rule).
135
See generally, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974); Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 536 (1965); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
136
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–53 (1967).
137
See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 506–07, 511–12 (1961) (spike
mike physically intruding into a “constitutionally protected area”); id. at 508–10
(distinguishing Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942), which involved a
“detectaphone” placed flush against a wall without physically penetrating into it);
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1928) (wiretap into home phone
lines on street outside).
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Amendment rights depended on the specific type of technology
used by the police in a particular instance, rather than on the
kind of evidence the police hoped to acquire.
In 1967, the Court in Katz rejected this narrow
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.138 Famously, the Court
declared that “the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places,” and ruled that the Fourth Amendment applied to the use
of an eavesdropping microphone affixed to the exterior of a glass
phone booth to perform surveillance on the occupant’s end of the
phone conversation.139 Rather than restrict the scope of the
Fourth Amendment to physical intrusions into houses or physical
inspections of tangible effects or papers, the Court recognized
that technological surveillance poses an equally great threat to
liberty and privacy.140 After all, eavesdropping or wiretapping a
phone call may be just as valuable to the police as reading a
person’s written papers, or a recording of a conversation just as
powerful evidence of guilt in court as revealing a written
document planning or confessing the crime. Accordingly, the
Court adopted a doctrinal test based on the exercise of reasoned
normative judgment about which police investigative techniques
should be subject to advance judicial review.141
Importantly, the Court’s doctrinal shift in Katz did not make
the Fourth Amendment concept of a “search” coextensive with
the existence of a police investigation for information or
evidence.142 For example, after Katz the Court reaffirmed the
“open fields” doctrine, which provides Fourth Amendment

138

See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
See id. at 351; see also id. at 359.
140
See id. at 355–58.
141
See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2246 (2018) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (“[A] normative understanding is the only way to make sense of this
Court’s precedents . . . .”); Nicholas Kahn-Fogel, An Examination of the Coherence of
Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 275, 283 & n.38,
39 (2016); Orin S. Kerr, Katz Has Only One Step: The Irrelevance of Subjective
Expectations, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 115, 132, 134 (2015); Orin S. Kerr, Four Models
of Fourth Amendment Protection, 60 STAN. L. REV. 503, 520 (2007); Matthew B.
Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment Circularity, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1754 (2017); Anna Lvovsky, Fourth Amendment Moralism, 166 U.
PA. L. REV. 1189, 1209 (2018); Matthew Tokson, Knowledge and Fourth Amendment
Privacy, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 139, 194 (2016).
142
But see Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2238 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that
the term “search” was not a term of art at the time of the Founding); see also Brief of
Scholars of the History and Original Meaning of the Fourth Amendment as Amici
Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 6–14, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206
(2018) (No. 16-402) [hereinafter Historical Scholars Brief].
139
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protection for homes and curtilage but not for other real property
owned by an individual.143 Fences and “no trespassing” signs are
insufficient, the Court determined, to meaningfully prevent
others—whether the public at large or the police—from crossing
rural land to observe marijuana growing in a wooded area over a
mile away from a home or to peer inside a barn housing an
amphetamine lab rather than horses or cattle.144 While the
individual landowners surely did not anticipate the police
discovery of their crimes in that manner, the Court ruled that no
reasonable expectation of privacy was breached by the police
physically crossing land and visually inspecting plants or
structures found in a location qualifying as open fields.145
Similarly, the Court did not determine that all forms of
technologically enhanced police investigation, simply by the fact
of that enhancement, justified the reliance on the warrant
requirement for oversight and accountability. The Katz decision
itself noted that information which a person “knowingly exposes
to the public” lacks constitutional protection from police
discovery.146
Katz distinguished the agents’ electronic
eavesdropping on the contents of the defendant’s spoken words,
which the phone booth kept obscured from being overheard by
the naked ear, and their visual observation of his presence
through the transparent glass, which the defendant accepted as a
necessary consequence of making the phone call on the street
rather than inside a building.147
In 1983, the Court applied this rationale in United States v.
Knotts to conclude that a person cannot claim a reasonable
expectation of privacy against observation of his movements on
public roads.148 Standing alone, police officers in an unmarked
car “tailing” a motor vehicle to track its location by following its
travels and keeping it in sight without revealing their presence
was not constitutionally distinguishable from constables
attempting to surreptitiously follow a person traveling on foot or

143
See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 294 (1987); Oliver v. United States,
466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924).
144
See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 297–300; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173–74.
145
See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300–04; Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179–81, 182.
146
See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
147
See id. at 352. “But what he sought to exclude when he entered the booth
was not the intruding eye—it was the uninvited ear.” Id.
148
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281–82 (1983).

2019]

A WARRANT REQUIREMENT RESURGENCE?

117

horseback in earlier times.149 In Knotts, however, the police
conducting visual observation using a pursuing car and overhead
helicopter supplemented their tracking by means of a
radio-transmitter beeper that emitted an intermittent pulse
detectable by an attuned receiver in the helicopter.150 The
defendant argued that this technologically enhanced surveillance
of the car’s drive from Minneapolis, Minnesota, to a cabin in
western Wisconsin required different treatment under Katz.151
The Court rejected that claim and held that the use of the beeper
to minimize the opportunity for error in tracking the defendant’s
location on public roads did not breach a reasonable expectation
of privacy, and thus no warrant was required.152
Although the Court in 2012 unanimously ruled in Jones that
the month-long warrantless GPS tracking of the defendant’s
vehicle violated his Fourth Amendment rights, the Court’s
reasoning in doing so reaffirmed the surveillance analysis under
Katz in contexts more closely resembling its original analog-era
incarnation.153 The majority opinion’s trespass test analysis has
no applicability in situations like Knotts, where the surveillance
involved only observation from afar.154 Likewise, the Jones
concurring opinion’s Katz analysis specifically emphasized that
short-term location tracking breaches no reasonable expectation
of privacy because it is a longstanding routine police practice that
consumes relatively few police resources.155 What distinguished
Jones from Knotts in the Katz analysis was both the quantity of
location tracking data gathered by the electronically enhanced
surveillance—not simply for twenty-eight days, but twenty-four
hours per day to accumulate over two thousand pages of location
data points—and the qualitative nature of the technology
involved—using automated hardware and software to generate
surveillance data with no human involvement and at minimal

149
See id. at 282–83, 285; see also Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 420 &
n.3 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
150
See Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277–79.
151
See id. at 284.
152
See id. at 281–82, 284–85; see also Jones, 565 U.S. at 429 n.10 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (noting limitations and fallibility of beeper technology in Knotts).
153
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 413–14 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 431 (Alito,
J., concurring).
154
See id. at 408–09, 411–12 (majority opinion).
155
See id. at 427, 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring).
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cost.156 When combined, these factors bypassed the significant
practical limitations which otherwise would make prohibitive the
notion of conducting extensive police surveillance of suspects’
public movements in mundane cases.157 Where such factors are
not involved, however, the traditional rule continues to apply
after Jones, permitting warrantless location tracking of public
movements.
The Court’s 2018 decision in Carpenter v. United States
reinforced this implication from Jones.158 Putting the defendant
on trial for his involvement in six robberies over several months,
the Government sought to establish his presence at the locations
of the robberies at the time of the crimes.159 To the extent the
prosecution’s case used traditional means of proving those facts,
such as testimony from fellow conspirators, no Fourth
Amendment issue was raised.160 But the Government also relied
heavily on historical cell-site location information (“CSLI”)
obtained from the archived business records of two mobile phone
service providers.161 After acquiring over 120 days of data
comprising nearly 13,000 data points, an investigating agent
testified at trial using maps marked with the crime scenes and
cellular antenna sites. This testimony demonstrated for the jury
how the CSLI corroborated the cooperating accomplices’
testimony about the defendant’s location at the pertinent times.
In addition, in closing argument, the prosecutor highlighted the
value of the CSLI evidence in proving the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.162
As in Jones and Riley, the Court distinguished the
information about the defendant’s location used in Carpenter by
emphasizing that historical CSLI is both quantitatively and
qualitatively different from previous forms of police location
surveillance.163 Like Jones, the massive amount of data gathered
156
See id. at 425–26, 428–31 (Alitor, J., concurring); see also id. at 403
(describing amount of data generated by GPS device attached to defendant’s
vehicle).
157
See id. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring).
158
See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215, 2216–17 (2018).
159
See id. at 2212–13.
160
Seven conspirators testified against Carpenter at trial. See id. at 2212. Even
if the Government learned of the person’s identity as fruit of an unconstitutional
search, a defendant cannot assert the exclusionary rule to bar the testimony of a
cooperating witness. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 279–80 (1978).
161
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
162
See id. at 2212–13.
163
See id. at 2217, 2218–19, 2220, 2223.
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about the defendant’s public movements only existed by
technologically bypassing resource constraints on obtaining such
evidence by human observation.164 Like Riley, the existence of
archived historical CSLI provided the Government with
information that literally would have been impossible to obtain
at common law, or even at the turn of the twenty-first century:
tracking a person’s public movements retroactively, not at the
time of their movements, with perfect electronic recall not subject
to the faults of human memory normally inherent in
reconstructing past events long after they have occurred.165
Finding these distinctions to be crucial, the Carpenter majority
rejected reflexive application of the third party doctrine to
deprive the location information of Fourth Amendment
protection simply because it originated in the companies’
archived business records.166 Instead, the majority viewed the
location surveillance data in Jones and Carpenter as functionally
identical in their impacts at the respective trials, such that the
difference in the manner of the data’s acquisition in the two cases
did not justify divergent doctrinal outcomes.167 Accordingly, the
Court held that the use of historical CSLI to reconstruct the
defendant’s public movements over a period of several months
breached his reasonable expectation of privacy, and thus violated
his Fourth Amendment rights because it was performed without
a search warrant.168

164

See id. at 2217, 2219–20.
See id. at 2218, 2219. Public and private security cameras and surveillance
cameras, especially when their feeds are recorded and then archived for extended
periods of time, raise the same issue. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Fourth
Amendment Future of Public Surveillance: Remote Recording and Other Searches in
Public Space, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 21, 26, 45 (2013); I. Bennett Capers, Crime,
Surveillance, and Communities, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 959, 963–64 (2013); Stephen
Rushin, The Judicial Response to Mass Police Surveillance, 2011 U. ILL. J.L. TECH.
& POL’Y 281, 286–89 (2011).
166
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217; see also id. at 2226 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); id. at 2260 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 2262 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
167
See id. at 2216–19 (majority opinion).
168
See id. at 2217, 2221, 2223. In Carpenter, the federal investigators obtained
the historical CSLI by means of a court order issued by a magistrate judge pursuant
to the Stored Communications Act (“SCA”), 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d). See id. at 2212.
The majority concluded that the SCA’s requirements were insufficient to protect
Carpenter’s Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 2221; see also id. at 2231, 2233
(Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2254–56, 2261 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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II. HOW FAR WILL THE RESURGENCE REACH?
In light of the Roberts Court’s Fourth Amendment decisions
over the past decade, especially taken as a whole, it is difficult to
dismiss the resurgence of the warrant requirement as
happenstance or coincidence.
Jones and Jardines have
reinvigorated the traditional protection against physical
inspections. Jones, Riley, and Carpenter have recognized that
the scope of data generated by simply living everyday life in the
United States in the internet-connected digital age—whether
that data is created by an individual, a corporation, or a
government investigator—requires new Fourth Amendment
principles not only to preserve the protections that existed at
common law but also to ensure equivalent protection in
technological scenarios unimaginable to the Framers. And
McNeely and Birchfield have emphasized the pragmatic reality
that these same technological developments mean that
electronically issued search warrants are easier than ever for the
police to apply for, and faster than ever for judges to approve or
reject, once the facts giving rise to probable cause are known.
Rather, the question is how far the Roberts Court’s
resurgence in the warrant requirement will extend. Is the Court
mainly acting on the margins, cautiously exercising restraint in
the scope of its cases and decisions, to prevent the police from
making a rapid technological end-run around the longstanding
constitutional and pragmatic limitations on their investigative
power?169 Or are we witnessing today what will someday be
remembered as the early decisions marking out a major reenvisioning of Fourth Amendment doctrines for the twenty-first
century?170 We may not yet be able to predict which assessment
is the more accurate one, but the answer will come as the Court
becomes forced to confront four key issues in its future decisions.

169
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Initial Reactions to Carpenter v. United States 4
(Univ. of S. Cal. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 18-14,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3209587; Orin S. Kerr,
An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV.
476, 479 (2011); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 802 (2004).
170
Compare, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968) (decision
recognizing taxpayer standing to raise Establishment Clause challenges, but which
failed to mark long-term shift in doctrine), with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 499 (1963) (decision widely regarded as origin of extensive and ongoing
substantive due process right to privacy doctrine).
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Expeditious Electronic Warrants and the Impracticability
Rationale

Several of the exceptions to the warrant requirement most
frequently relevant in the context of criminal investigations by
the police are based on a rationale of impracticability. In
recognizing these exceptions, the Court has concluded that a
warrantless search is constitutionally permissible because the
practical realities of these situations make it unfeasible or
inappropriate to require the police to delay the search to obtain a
warrant in advance, and instead, judicial review afterward is
sufficient to protect Fourth Amendment interests. While the
decisions in McNeely and Birchfield ruled only as to the
applicability of the exigent circumstances exception in the
specific context of a BAC blood draw in a DUI investigation, the
Court’s reasoning in those cases has potentially significant
implications for all of the exceptions based on the
impracticability rationale.
Some situations of exigent circumstances, of course, will
continue to present the problem of impracticability no matter
how fast the electronic search warrant process becomes. Hot
pursuit of a fleeing, dangerous felony suspect, for example,
should not be ceased even if a search warrant to enter a
residence could be obtained in a matter of minutes, because even
a brief delay creates risks such as the taking of hostages or a
barricaded ambush or shootout.171 Likewise, a mentally unwell
individual who is a danger to himself or others deserves
immediate intervention, rather than risk the tragic harms that
could occur while waiting even briefly for a warrant.172 On the
other hand, McNeely and Birchfield correctly require that the
determination of whether the destruction or loss of perishable
evidence is “imminent” enough to overcome the warrant
requirement depends not only on the nature of the evidence and
the pace of its disappearance, but also on the likely length of any
delay attendant to obtaining a warrant before securing the
evidence. While it is true that moderate quantities of narcotics
can be flushed down the toilet quickly, it would take considerably
longer to shred a large number of paper documents or erase an

171
See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–300 (1967); United States v.
Ibarra-Zelaya, 465 F.3d 596, 605–06 (5th Cir. 2006); Edward H. Arens, Note, Armed
Standoffs and the Warrant Requirement, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1517, 1526–27 (2008).
172
See Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45, 45, 48 (2009) (per curiam).
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entire hard drive of digital files, which might very well be
deemed more analogous to the rate of naturally metabolizing of
BAC. Thus, McNeely and Birchfield reemphasize the rejection of
bright-line rules and the continuing importance of the
longstanding totality of circumstances analysis in exigency
cases.173
Other important exceptions to the warrant requirement,
however, traditionally have relied upon categorical rules of
impracticability rather than a case-by-case approach. Since its
inception in the Prohibition era, the automobile exception has
been grounded in the rationale that motor vehicles are readily
mobile, and therefore evidence contained within them inherently
carries the possibility that it will vanish before a search warrant
can be obtained.174 The Court’s cases consistently have applied
this categorical rule to all motor vehicle searches regardless of
the particular facts, such as a roadside traffic stop fully under
the control of the police after a controlled delivery of marijuana
in California v. Acevedo, and even a car secured in the impound
lot at a police station in Chambers v. Maroney.175 Likewise, the
search incident to arrest exception’s categorical approach to the
impracticability rationale has been applied not only to allow the
police to find and secure physical items at the scene of the arrest,
but also to permit subsequent laboratory testing of items
recovered to determine their nature, such as the presence of
heroin inside gelatin capsules found in a cigarette carton in
United States v. Robinson or cocaine found in a bag in a jacket
pocket in Arizona v. Gant.176
The reasoning in McNeely and Birchfield emphasizing the
increasingly expeditious availability of electronic warrants calls
into question the continuing doctrinal soundness of maintaining
a categorical impracticability approach for these exceptions. The
automobile exception is premised on the existence of probable
cause anyway, so the issuance of search warrants for the subject
vehicles should be expected to be routine and uneventful.
173

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2174 (2016); see Missouri v.
McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559–60, 1559 n.3, 1563 (2013); id. at 1568–69 (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
174
See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991); California v. Carney, 471
U.S. 386, 390 (1985) (emphasizing reduced expectation of privacy in motor vehicles
compared to homes).
175
See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 566–68; Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 43–46
(1970).
176
See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
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Chambers seems particularly dubious now that warrants can be
obtained so quickly; there is little meaningful possibility that
evidence will disappear from a motor vehicle in a secured police
facility in the time it would take to obtain an electronic warrant.
Similarly, when the occupants of a car have been or will be
arrested in a roadside stop, it is difficult to see why a short delay
to obtain an electronic warrant would interfere with the recovery
of the criminal evidence if the car will be towed from the scene
and secured in any event. Perhaps a roadside warrantless search
would be suitable in some situations, such as when the officer
intends to allow other occupants of the car to depart in the
vehicle after seizing evidence against a single suspect—but such
an assessment would be entirely consistent with abrogating the
categorical approach and instead evaluating warrantless
searches on a case-by-case basis.
Likewise, a categorical authorization of some warrantless
searching incident to arrest is appropriate to permit the police to
protect against ambush and loss of destructible evidence—which
inherently must occur at the moment of the arrest to serve the
purpose of that immediate inspection. On the other hand, when
police have probable cause to believe that an item or substance
discovered during a search incident to arrest is an illegal
narcotic, a stolen good, or other criminal evidence requiring
further confirmation beyond plain view, an electronic warrant
easily could be obtained in the time between the arrest and the
additional inquiry to confirm its nature.177
Rejecting a
categorical approach for subsequent analysis of items seized
during a search incident to arrest would preserve the authority of
the police to search any arrestee’s property by obtaining a
warrant when they have a valid basis to do so, while eliminating
the ability of the police to conduct fishing expeditions in the
personal effects of an arrestee in the hope of stumbling across

177

The Court has held that even the simple act of slightly adjusting the position
of electronic equipment to read and record the serial number, then confirming
whether it had been reported stolen, could not be justified under the plain view
doctrine and instead constituted a separate evidentiary “search” requiring probable
cause and a warrant. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324–25, 326–27 (1987).
Under current doctrine, however, subsequent analysis of items discovered during a
search incident to arrest is not subject to this limitation because that exception, not
plain view, governs the additional inspection. See supra note 98 and accompanying
text.
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criminal evidence, even unrelated to the crime of arrest.178 While
it is true that the Court’s reasoning in Riley for requiring
warrants to search a device’s digital data is based primarily on
its assessment of the dramatically heightened risk of improper
disclosure of private information compared to physical papers or
effects found during an arrest, the Court’s ongoing cases about
digital data could result in a reconsideration of the appropriate
scope of warrantless searches of physical objects as well.179
Finally, a similar concern exists under the plain view
doctrine, including for searches carried out pursuant to a valid
warrant. When the police are lawfully present to observe
evidence and have lawful access to seize that evidence, they may
take custody of what they believe to be criminal evidence on the
spot without first obtaining a warrant so long as the probable
cause justifying that belief is “immediately apparent” without
further investigation beyond the initial observation.180 Often,
this doctrine applies when the police inadvertently encounter
evidence of one crime while searching for evidence of another, but
it is not limited to such situations.181 Accordingly, sometimes the
police will seize a fairly large quantity of evidence without a
warrant and seek to justify the seizure under the plain view
doctrine—and the courts must determine whether police
improperly expanded a valid initial search into a new, separate
search for which a warrant should have been obtained.182 This
178
For example, in Gant the Court abrogated the categorical approach
previously governing searches of cars incident to arrest to instead require
fact-specific justification for searching the car: either to protect the police because
the scene was in fact unsecured or to locate and seize evidence of the crime of arrest
which could be present in the vehicle. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343–44
(2009); id. at 352–53 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Riley, however, the Court reaffirmed
Robinson’s rationale that “unknown physical objects may always pose risks, no
matter how slight, during the tense atmosphere of a custodial arrest;” accordingly,
because “[t]he officer in Robinson testified that he could not identify the objects in
the cigarette pack but knew they were not cigarettes,” then “a further search was a
reasonable protective measure”—that is, the subsequent warrantless laboratory
testing which confirmed the presence of heroin in the gelatin capsules found in the
cigarette pack. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 386 (2014).
179
See Riley, 573 U.S. at 406–07 (Alito, J., concurring) (noting different
treatment after Riley of physical papers and digital data carried on the person).
180
See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993); Arizona v. Hicks,
480 U.S. 321, 334–35 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
181
See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135 (1990).
182
See, e.g., United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1271, 1276 (10th Cir. 1999)
(holding that discovery of over 200 image files of child pornography found while
executing search warrant for narcotics offenses exceeded scope of warrant); United
States v. Gray, 78 F. Supp. 2d 524, 530–31 (E.D. Va. 1999) (holding that discovery of
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problem has become especially acute in searches of digital data,
where an inspection pursuant to a search warrant related to one
offense, such as financial or narcotics crimes, may lead to the
discovery of substantial evidence of another crime in plain
view—often child pornography, the nature of which frequently is
immediately apparent.183 Although the Court has yet to consider
a case presenting such facts, the emphasis in McNeely and
Birchfield on the ready availability of electronic warrants
suggests that police should be discouraged from acquiring
extensive evidence under the plain view doctrine based on
probable cause alone in situations where it would have been easy
to obtain a search warrant to clearly validate the continuing
discovery of additional evidence and its seizure.
B.

“Surveillance” in the Digital Age: Aggregation, Data-Mining,
and Mosaic Theory

Long before today’s sophisticated data-gathering and
data-analysis technology came into being, the Court
acknowledged that the ability of the Government to conduct
omnipresent surveillance of anyone—or everyone—might require
different treatment under the Fourth Amendment than
traditional common law investigative techniques and their
marginal improvement by simplistic technological enhancement.
In Knotts, for example, the Court noted the defendant’s
contention that “the result of the holding sought by the
government would be that twenty-four hour surveillance of any
citizen of this country will be possible, without judicial
knowledge or supervision,” but rejected it because “the reality
hardly suggests abuse . . . if such dragnet type law enforcement
practices as [defendant] envisions should eventually occur, there

images of child pornography found while executing warrant for computer hacking
offenses, used to obtain second warrant to search computer for child pornography,
was permissible under plain view doctrine).
183
See Adam M. Gershowitz, The Post-Riley Search Warrant: Search Protocols
and Particularity in Cell Phone Searches, 69 VAND. L. REV. 585, 598–99 (2016); Orin
S. Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence: The Case for Use Restrictions on
Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2015); Orin S. Kerr, Searches and
Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 569–70 (2005); see also, e.g.,
James T. Stinsman, Comment, Computer Seizures and Searches: Rethinking the
Applicability of the Plain View Doctrine, 83 TEMP. L. REV. 1097, 1097–98 (2011);
David J. S. Ziff, Note, Fourth Amendment Limitations on the Execution of Computer
Searches Conducted Pursuant to A Warrant, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 841, 846 (2005).
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will be time enough then to determine whether different
constitutional principles may be applicable.”184
That time undeniably has arrived. The Riley Court rightly
described the incredible amount of detail about a person, from
mundane activities and interests to the most intimate aspects of
private life, which can be gleaned from accessing and evaluating
the multitude of text, images, and other data stored on
smartphones or laptops or in the internet cloud accounts linked
from such devices.185 But the information contained in and
revealed by a person’s own tangible and electronic “papers” is
only one component of the data about a person generated and
retained in the digital age. Just as the Court in Kyllo recognized
that the use of sense-enhancing technology to make a
constructive entry into a home must be subject to the warrant
requirement in the same manner as physical entries, so too
limiting the Fourth Amendment analysis merely to the
Government’s direct intrusion into stored personal data, as
occurred in Riley, would ignore the substantial dangers to
privacy and liberty posed by many other forms of data-driven
surveillance.
Fortunately, the Court in Jones and Carpenter took
important initial steps in subjecting police investigations relying
upon data-driven surveillance to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.
Although both cases involved data gathering about a defendant’s
public movements and data analysis to connect the defendant’s
location at certain times and places to the crimes charged, as well
as a holding that the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights had
been violated by the failure to obtain a search warrant before
performing such extensive surveillance,186 the underlying
rationale for the decisions is not limited to a person’s location
information. Without adopting a particular doctrinal definition
like the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test or the Jones
trespass test, the Court explained the key factors justifying
judicial oversight of newly developing modes of sophisticated
data-driven surveillance in light of the significant differences
from the investigative methods and outcomes traditionally
available at common law.
184
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 283–84 (1983) (internal citations and
quotations omitted).
185
See Riley, 573 U.S. at 393–97.
186
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018); Jones v. United
States, 565 U.S. 400, 404–05 (2012).
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First, data-driven surveillance allows the Government to
gather vastly greater quantities of information about a person
than has ever been possible before. As the concurring opinion in
Jones noted, constant month-long surveillance of a suspect’s
public movements by police officers would be cost-prohibitive in
both financial and personnel resources, except perhaps in
investigations of extraordinary importance.187 The amount of
data acquired in Carpenter was even larger.188
Prior to
automated technological tracking and recordkeeping like GPS
monitoring or historical CSLI archives, this sheer quantity of
data gathering was literally unattainable in routine
investigations such as those of the local drug dealer in Jones or
the half-dozen store robberies in Carpenter.189 With the rapidly
changing scope of advancing technology in mind, the Court
declined to quantify a specific numerical boundary on the amount
of data-gathering that is permissible prior to advance judicial
review. The Carpenter majority concluded that the week’s worth
of CSLI data obtained from Sprint constituted a “search”
requiring a warrant supported by probable cause.190 The Jones
concurring opinion offered another perspective: when police are
unsure about the extent of their authority, they should err on the
side of obtaining a warrant.191
Second, data-driven surveillance also provides the
Government with information of a very different qualitative
nature than has ever existed previously. The real-time GPS
tracker in Jones offered the investigators a zero percent error
rate and offered the jury a portrait of the defendant’s movements
free from doubts about human perception, memory, and
credibility.192 The CSLI data in Carpenter had those same

187

See 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring).
See 138 S. Ct. at 2212.
189
Jones owned and operated a nightclub in Washington, D.C. while involved in
a conspiracy to distribute cocaine and cocaine base. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–03.
Carpenter was the leader of a conspiracy charged with the robbery of six stores. See
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2212. By contrast, in the familiar case of Costello v. United
States, the defendant’s trial on tax evasion charges for three tax years involved the
prosecution’s presentation of 144 witnesses and 368 exhibits to prove the extent of
the defendant’s unreported income. 350 U.S. 359, 360 (1956); see also id. at 363
(rejecting defendant’s constitutional challenge to grand jury’s indictment based on
hearsay testimony of three IRS agents summarizing evidence later produced in full
at trial).
190
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 n.3.
191
See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
192
See id.; see also id. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
188
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advantages plus the added benefit of allowing the police to
retroactively reconstruct the defendant’s movements long after
they had occurred, when the weaknesses in memory and
credibility would have been far larger hurdles for police or
prosecutors to overcome.193 Again the Court declined to offer any
particular definition of the qualitative nature of technologically
assisted data-driven surveillance that is permissible without a
search warrant. Rather, the ambiguity in this aspect of the
Court’s doctrinal line between police investigative activity on
their own initiative and “searches” governed by the Fourth
Amendment serves to reinvigorate the longstanding basis for the
warrant requirement from Johnson: to create significant
incentives for the police to proceed with judicial review in
advance as much as possible when an indeterminate scope of
privacy or liberty interests is at stake.194
The Court’s decisions in Jones and Carpenter become even
more significant when taking into account the potential extent of
today’s data-driven surveillance to reach far beyond the
relatively simplistic use of such techniques in those cases. It is
one thing for the police to generate or acquire a database of
location points and undertake data-mining to retrieve certain
particular dates and times of great utility in a particular criminal
prosecution. It is something else entirely for the police to
aggregate multiple sources of data, perhaps even combining
several expansive databases in doing so, and then mine this
aggregation to learn information that could not have been
determined from any dataset individually—thereby creating
information that literally did not exist anywhere in the world
until the police investigation brought it into existence. While it
is true that grand juries, administrative agencies, and legislative
bodies possess subpoena power capable of conducting extensive
investigations and amassing substantial amounts of information,
those institutions have different forms of accountability and
oversight compared to ordinary police activity.195 The Court’s
193

See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2218.
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
195
The dissenting justices in Carpenter argued that the court orders issued to
the cellular providers to disclose their historical CSLI records pursuant to the
provisions of the Stored Communications Act were functionally equivalent to
subpoenas and therefore did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Carpenter, 138
S. Ct. at 2228–29 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); id. at 2247–57 (Alito, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 2244 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The majority opinion rejected this analogy
on the facts, maintaining that “this Court has never held that the Government may
194
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implicit acceptance of the “mosaic theory” of the Fourth
Amendment thus recognizes that a police investigation which
gathers and analyzes data in a manner that provides a
comprehensive picture of a person’s life is a form of state action
worthy of stringent judicial oversight.196
Although the specific factual context is different, the Court’s
analysis is consistent with the conclusion that police
investigative methods and outcomes achieved by data-driven
surveillance can be viewed as functionally equivalent to the
general warrants despised by the Framers.197 When the police
can investigate anyone, anywhere, at any time in pursuit of
solving crimes, no one is secure in their persons, property, or
liberty.198 General warrants issued to law enforcement officers
subpoena third parties for records in which the suspect has a reasonable expectation
of privacy.” Id. at 2221 (majority opinion); see also id. at 2222 (addressing Alito’s
dissent). But see id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (addressing the majority opinion’s
statement). Traditional subpoenas are distinguishable on other grounds as well. See
generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.7 (2018). Unlike
ordinary police investigations, legislators are directly politically accountable to their
constituents; administrative agencies are constrained to the specific range of subject
matters within their delegation of executive authority, and most administrative
subpoenas are issued pursuant to civil rather than criminal enforcement actions.
Likewise, the ordinary citizens serving as jurors function as a check on prosecutorial
overreach during a grand jury investigation of criminal activity, and, unlike a search
warrant, the recipient of a grand jury subpoena has the opportunity to challenge the
validity or scope of the subpoena before a judge prior to appearing before the grand
jury. See id. § 8.4(b). The court orders issued pursuant to the SCA, by contrast, are
compulsory process issued in the same manner as a warrant—an ex parte
proceeding involving only the Government and the judge—but without the
requirements of probable cause and particularity required for search warrants. See
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221–22; see also Historical Scholars Brief, supra note 142,
at 29. While the company receiving the SCA order may object prior to compliance if
its scope is excessively broad or burdensome, the party whose data is being obtained
has no notice or opportunity to be heard as to the validity or scope of the request. See
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2221; id. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (discussing 18
U.S.C.A § 2703(d) (West 2014)). Thus, the majority in Carpenter declined to apply
the Fourth Amendment analysis applicable to traditional subpoenas, including from
grand juries, to SCA court orders issued to facilitate ordinary police investigations.
196
See Priester, supra note 18, at 522–24; see also, e.g., Emily Berman, When
Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 102 MINN. L. REV. 577, 578
(2017); David Gray & Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 62, 67 (2013); Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment,
111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 314 (2012); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz,
Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic Theory,
2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205, 209 (2015).
197
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213.
198
See id. at 2217–20; see also Historical Scholars Brief, supra note 142, at
14–28; Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment as a Collective Right, 43 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 255, 264 (2010).
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represent a paradigm case that the Fourth Amendment sought to
address, and the Court rightly applies its protections not merely
to the exact facts contemplated by the Framers but also to
contemporary scenarios presenting the same kind and degree of
threats of governmental abuse of power.199
C.

The Third-Party Doctrine and Business Records

Concerns about the Government’s ability to use vast
quantities of digital data to compile a chillingly gigantic portfolio
of data on a criminal suspect—or, worse, on every American—are
exacerbated by orders of magnitude when the Government can
acquire and analyze data not only from its own surveillance
activities but also from the seemingly endless array of ordinary
business records generated every second of every day in the
interconnected age.
Cellphone locations in real time and
archived for years, internet traffic from deliberate browsing and
apps running in the background, electronic financial transactions
with no tangible paper trail, and a multitude of other mundane
tasks in everyday affairs would provide a comprehensive portrait
of an individual’s entire life if they could be easily aggregated
and data-mined. Under the extant third-party doctrine, however,
the acquisition of business records by the police is not a “search”
for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore no factual
basis in articulable individual suspicion, much less a warrant, is
required to obtain them—regardless of the amount of information
acquired or the scope of the intimate details of a person’s life
thereby revealed.
The third-party doctrine’s rejection of Fourth Amendment
challenges to police investigations of business records originates
in United States v. Miller, a 1976 decision regarding bank
records, and Smith v. Maryland, a 1979 decision involving a
record of phone numbers dialed to connect calls through a
company’s network.200
The Court transposed the analysis
applicable to undercover agents, confidential informants, and
flipped cooperating criminals—that an individual cannot claim

199
See JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME: A THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL
SELF-GOVERNMENT 178–95 (2001) (arguing for a “paradigm case interpretation” of
the Constitution).
200
See generally Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v.
Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976). See also Cal. Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,
52–54 (1974) (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to subpoena provisions of
Bank Secrecy Act of 1970).
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that a reasonable expectation of privacy was breached when a
“false friend” betrays their confidences to the police201—to
conclude that a person equally “assumes the risk” that a business
will provide evidence of transactions or interactions in its records
to the police.202 In Miller, federal agents reviewed four months of
account statements and microfilm archives of cleared checks,
ultimately using a small number of those documents at the
defendant’s trial to establish purchases and a vehicle rental as
overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy.203
In Smith,
anticipating that a robbery suspect would continue his pattern of
phone calls taunting a previous victim, the police had the phone
company install a pen register at its office to record the phone
numbers dialed from the suspect’s home phone—and the suspect
made another call to the victim’s home that very same day.204
Along with considerable evidence obtained from the suspect’s
home pursuant to a subsequent search warrant, the record from
the pen register was introduced at his trial.205 Thus, in both
cases the scope of the business records obtained by the police was
small, and the amount of them used at trial even smaller.
The Court’s reasoning in these decisions has been dubious
from its inception,206 but the consequences of a reflexive
application of the doctrine to massive quantities of digital
business records have led to numerous calls to revisit or abrogate
the doctrine.207 Several important points are worth noting. For
201
See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 (citing United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745,
751–52 (1971)); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963)).
202
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 742–45, 747; Miller, 425 U.S. at 443.
203
Miller, 425 U.S. at 437–38. The bank received a grand jury subpoena, but
law enforcement agents reviewed the documents on site at the bank so that bank
officers would not have to appear before the grand jury. See id.
204
Smith, 442 U.S. at 737; see also State v. Smith, 389 A.2d 858, 859–60 (Md.
1978).
205
Smith, 442 U.S. at 737–38.
206
See Smith, 442 U.S. at 747 (Stewart, J., dissenting); id. at 748–50 (Marshall,
J., dissenting); Miller, 425 U.S. at 455–56 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also, e.g.,
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2262–63, 2272 (2018) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); David A. Harris, Riley v. California and the Beginning of the End for the
Third-Party Search Doctrine, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 895, 897–98 (2016); Priester,
supra note 18, at 525–26, 525 n.190 (citing representative scholarship).
207
See Priester, supra note 18, at 523–29; see also Brief for Petitioner at 35–53,
65–76, Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018) (No. 16-402); Brief of
Amici Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation et al. in Support of Petitioner at 24–29,
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402) [hereinafter EFF Brief]; Brief of Amici
Curiae Empirical Fourth Amendment Scholars in Support of Petitioner at 2–14,
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402); Brief of Scholars of Criminal Procedure and
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one, it is far easier for the police to access and review—or to
make duplicate copies of—archived electronic business records
compared to the paper files that existed at common law, or even
Miller’s microfilm. Digital data can be indexed, word-searched,
and cross-referenced by software—a far cry from the slow and
labor-intensive process of manually viewing documents to
identify pertinent information or to synthesize relevant data
across multiple records.
In addition, the rapid expansion of memory capacity in
digital devices, much less the effectively infinite storage available
in the internet’s cloud, has dramatically reduced the practical
limitations that previously constrained the quantity and duration
of the retention of a company’s records in the ordinary course of
business. Gone are the days of costly expenses to maintain
records archives, including renting warehouse space to store
banker’s boxes of old records, destroying them after time has
elapsed to make room for newer files, and paying an employee or
outside vendor to monitor and implement such a document
retention policy. It is literally inconceivable that cellphone
service carriers would retain years’ worth of historical CSLI
records—relating to all of their hundreds of thousands of
antennae and many billions of data points of activity passing
through those towers from all cellphones, including their own
millions of customers as well as users accessing the network via
roaming agreements with other carriers—if those records had to
be kept on paper rather than as digital data stored on servers.208
And if businesses are retaining many more documents for a
much longer period of time, then the police will be able to obtain
access to information that previously would have disappeared
long before they sought it. Just as the use of digital location data
has enabled the police to construct a mosaic of a person’s public
movements that would have been entirely impossible even a few

Privacy as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14–30, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct.
2206 (No. 16-402); Brief for Technology Cos. as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither
Party at 23–25, 28–33, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402).
208
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211–12 (“There are 396 million cell phone
service accounts in the United States—for a Nation of 326 million people.”); see also
EFF Brief, supra note 207, at 5–10 (providing information regarding number of cell
phones, number of cell sites and antennae, and quantity of data transferred over
cellular networks over time, emphasizing dramatic growth in each, especially after
2010); Brief of Technology Experts as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at
14–27, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402); Brief for Technology Cos., supra note
207, at 12–23.
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decades ago, so too the nature and longevity of digital business
records has eliminated the practical constraints which would
have made impossible the kind of data collection and analysis
that can be done quickly and cheaply today.209
Fortunately, the Court is aware of these concerns.
Concurring in Jones, Justice Sotomayor urged the Court to
reconsider the doctrine in an appropriate case.210 Although the
question was briefed and argued in Carpenter,211 the majority
declined to expressly overrule the entire third-party doctrine or
revisit in detail its underlying conceptual basis, instead
distinguishing the historical CSLI records on the facts.212 Days
after Carpenter was handed down, the Court denied certiorari to
a petition challenging the third-party doctrine as applied to the
Government’s acquisition of internet protocol traffic data from an
internet service provider’s network while investigating a
notorious internet drug trafficking kingpin known as “Dread
Pirate Roberts,” a reference to The Princess Bride rather than the
Chief Justice.213 The prospects for the ongoing retention of the
third-party doctrine might have appeared stronger if the
Government had prevailed in Carpenter, but the ramifications of
the Court’s holding in favor of the defendant reach well beyond
historical CSLI records—and the Court’s review of additional
cases involving digital business records is seemingly inevitable.
209
Although Justice Alito recognized the implication of the Government
technologically bypassing traditional limitations in Jones, he did not reach the same
conclusion in Carpenter for third-party business records. See 138 S. Ct. at 2259–60
(Alito, J., dissenting); Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 429–31 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring).
210
See 565 U.S. at 417–18 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
211
See supra note 207; Transcript of Oral Argument at 4–6, 15–17, 22–27,
41–42, 50–51, 67–70, Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (No. 16-402).
212
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217, 2219–20; see also id. at 2227, 2230,
2232–33 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority’s arguments on third party
doctrine); Kerr, supra note 169, at 12.
213
See Ulbricht v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2708, 2708 (2018) (denying petition
for certiorari); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11–22, Ulbricht, 138 S. Ct. 2708
(No. 17-950). Unlike the existing historical business records sought in Carpenter and
similar to the pen register for telephone dialing information in Smith, the agents
investigating Dread Pirate Roberts and Silk Road conducted real-time monitoring of
the defendant’s internet traffic under a “pen/trap order” issued pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3122. See United States v. Ulbricht, 858 F.3d 71, 83–84, 94–98 (2d Cir.
2017). “The name alludes to the pseudonym of a pirate in the popular novel and film
The Princess Bride that is periodically passed on from one individual to another.” Id.
at 87 n.12 (citing WILLIAM GOLDMAN, THE PRINCESS BRIDE: S. MORGENSTERN’S
CLASSIC TALE OF TRUE LOVE AND HIGH ADVENTURE (1973); THE PRINCESS BRIDE
(20th Century Fox 1987)).
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D. Data is Different
In the Court’s constitutional law applicable to criminal
sentencing, the aphorism “death is different” reflects the
longstanding conflict among the justices over the appropriateness
of imposing heightened procedural requirements and additional
substantive limitations in capital cases through interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment.214 An even more controversial part of
that doctrine is the reliance on “evolving standards of decency” to
render unconstitutional some capital sentencing practices
previously permitted by the Court’s precedent.215
The reality that data is different poses a similar interpretive
challenge for the Court under the Fourth Amendment. This is
especially true because differences between data gathering and
data analysis on the one hand, and traditional modes and
outcomes of police investigations on the other, will only continue
to become greater over time—with the pace of change and
corresponding divergence proceeding more quickly than ever
before. Kyllo and Jardines are important decisions in ensuring
that the march of technology does not strip away the traditional
privacy and security of the home, but they involved specific
investigative acts on a particular occasion to make a discrete
factual finding about the contents of a home at that precise
moment. Jones, Riley, and Carpenter raise the prospect of much
broader, and much more disturbing, police investigations into
extensive details of individuals’ lives and activities over
expansive periods of time. It is no surprise, therefore, that the
Court has treaded cautiously in both its holdings and its
reasoning during its initial forays into the future of the Fourth
Amendment.216
The difficulty of this challenge is apparent from the wide
range of perspectives among the justices of the Roberts Court
about how to approach the Fourth Amendment analysis in data214
See, e.g., Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 84 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring); Murray
v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 21 n.9 (1989) (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
411 (1986)).
215
See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469–70 (2012); Graham v. Florida,
560 U.S. 48, 58 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560–61 (2005). And of
course, criminal procedure is far from the only area of constitutional law where the
Court faces the problem of applying doctrine to changing circumstances or new
technology. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2090–91 (2018)
(taxation of internet commerce).
216
See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM
ON THE SUPREME COURT 3 (1999).
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investigation cases. The textual enumeration of protecting
“persons, houses, papers, and effects” from “searches” that are
“unreasonable” provides at least the minimum scope of Fourth
Amendment rights, but the justices do not agree about how much
further the constitutional protection should extend.217 Likewise,
the original understanding of the Amendment’s meaning may be
fairly analogous in some contexts but analytically unhelpful in
others.218 Even the Court’s own precedent from the pre-digital
era may be proving unworkable, with criticisms ranging from
eliminating the third-party doctrine to the suggestion that the
Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test should be abrogated
in favor of limiting the scope of the doctrine to the enumerated
interests.219
Yet, the Roberts Court also recognizes the unavoidable need
for the law to keep pace with changing technology, as well as
society’s changing perceptions of that technology. Ideally, much
of the initial response to technological and social change should
come from the legislature; Congress previously acted to address
wiretaps and pen registers, foreign intelligence surveillance
during the Cold War, and internet computer fraud.220 State
217

Compare, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2213–19 (applying the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test and corresponding case precedent to
determine scope of Fourth Amendment protections), with id. at 2238–43 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (rejecting application of the Katz privacy-based doctrine in favor of
limiting Fourth Amendment protections to enumerated interests).
218
Compare, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2013) (analogizing
common law bloodhounds and contemporary narcotics-sniffing dogs), with Jones v.
United States, 565 U.S. 400, 429–31, 429 n.10 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring) (rejecting
analogy of common law location surveillance to technological GPS tracking).
219
See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (questioning
Katz test); id. at 2264 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (questioning Katz test); Jones, 565
U.S. at 415–16 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (questioning third party doctrine).
220
See, e.g., Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1030(a), 98 Stat. 1837, 2190 (1984) (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)) (Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, first enacted in Comprehensive
Crime Control Act of 1984 and subsequently expanded by amendment in 1986, 1992,
1996, 2001, and 2008); Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L.
No. 90-351, tit. III, 82 Stat. 197, 211 (1968) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A §§ 2510–22 (West
2014)) (“Title III” of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
governing wiretapping and electronic surveillance, enacted in response to Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967), and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967));
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, § 3121-126, 100
Stat. 1848, 1868 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121–27 (West 2014)) (“Pen/Trap
Statute” applicable to pen register and trap-and-trace surveillance, enacted in
Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986); Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, § 105(a), 92 Stat. 1783, 1790 (1978) (codified at 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 1801–62 (West 2014)) (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978).
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legislatures have enacted important protections for data privacy
as well, implicating how both law enforcement and corporations
make use of “Big Data” gathering and analysis.221 In May 2018,
many U.S. consumers received numerous emails or other notices
regarding updates to the data-privacy policies of companies doing
business in the European Union due to implementation of the
General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”).222
Although
public policy solutions enacted in statutes may not always be
constitutionally sufficient, as with the already-anachronistic
provisions of the Stored Communications Act at issue in
Carpenter,223 it is far easier for the Court to review the terms of a
comprehensive solution enacted by the legislature than to
attempt to govern the field itself through constitutional
interpretation.

Justice Alito has expressly urged legislative action to address Fourth Amendment
concerns related to technological advancements. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2261
(Alito, J., dissenting); Jones, 565 U.S. at 429–30 (Alito, J., concurring).
221
See, e.g., Melody Gutierrez, Gov. Jerry Brown Signs Far-Reaching California
Internet Privacy Bill, S.F. CHRON. (June 28, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
politics/article/California-lawmakers-approve-internet-privacy-13034880.php
(“Under AB375, web users can demand that a business tell them what personal
information it is collecting about them, whether it is selling or sharing it, and who is
ending up with it. Consumers can also tell a company to delete their personal
information.”). An excellent discussion of the dangers of “Big Data” is found in
FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY 19–58 (2015). Privacy is just one area in
which legislation to address new technologies is necessary. See, e.g., Taly
Matiteyahu, Drone Regulations and Fourth Amendment Rights: The Interaction of
State Drone Statutes and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 48 COLUM. J.L. &
SOC. PROBS. 265, 267–68 (2015).
222
See, e.g., Kathleen Paisley, It’s All About the Data: The Impact of the EU
General Data Protection Regulation on International Arbitration, 41 FORDHAM INT’L
L.J. 841, 846 (2018); Brian Fung, Why You’re Getting Flooded with Privacy
Notifications in Your Email; Everyone from Airbnb to Yelp is Suddenly Updating
Their Terms of Service, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018), https://www.washington
post.com/news/the-switch/wp/2018/05/25/why-youre-getting-flooded-with-privacynotifications-in-your-email/?utm_term=.d47d931bdcf4;
Nikhil
Kalyanpur
&
Abraham Newman, Today, a New E.U. Law Transforms Privacy Rights for
Everyone. Without Edward Snowden, It Might Never Have Happened., WASH. POST
(May 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/05/25/
today-a-new-eu-law-transforms-privacy-rights-for-everyone-without-edwardsnowden-it-might-never-have-happened/?utm_term=.f566eafc755d.
223
See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 207, at 49–50 (noting that 1986
enactment of and 1994 amendments to SCA “neither intended to address nor even
considered CSLI, much less whether obtaining longer-term CSLI should require a
warrant” and emphasizing that “Congress simply did not anticipate the
contemporary ubiquity of cell phones and the volume and precision of CSLI that
would be retained by service providers”).
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At the same time, these changes in legislation and social
norms also may affect how the Court assesses the meaning of the
Constitution.224 In many of today’s data-privacy policies, a
company will use the term “your data” to refer to the information
that is acquired, retained, transferred, or deleted under the
provisions of the policy. The typical meaning of that term has
been “data that we possess about you” pursuant to Terms of
Service or related adhesion contracts.
In view of
consumer-favorable changes required by the GDPR and similar
laws, however, the meaning may be shifting toward “data about
you in our records over which you have some legally enforceable
rights.” And it would not mark much of a shift for the meaning
to become “information about you that you have a right to control
and we happen to possess.”
Thus, the phrase “your data” is one answer to the question
“whose data?”—and possession or custody of digital information
is only one aspect of the answer, just as multiple forms of legal
interests in tangible and real property can exist
simultaneously.225 Byrd’s functional rather than formalistic
evaluation of the scope of Fourth Amendment rights for a
contractually unauthorized driver of a rental car is only the most
recent example of the Court rejecting a legalistic or
hyper-technical interpretation of the people’s protection for
“their” tangible papers or effects.226
In Carpenter, Justice
Gorsuch suggested that the same principle may apply to digital
data and business records—so that information about you could
be yours in a constitutional sense even though you did not create
or store it yourself.227 Though no other justice joined his opinion
in that case, the notion already is present in the Court’s mind.

224

See, e.g., William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the
Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1828 (2016); Nicholas A. Kahn-Fogel,
The Benefits of Using Investigative Legislation to Interpret the Fourth Amendment: A
Response to Orin Kerr, 9 ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 379, 380–81 (2018); Orin S. Kerr,
The Effect of Legislation on Fourth Amendment Protection, 115 MICH. L. REV. 1117,
1119–20 (2017); Richard M. Re, The Positive Law Floor, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 313,
314 (2016).
225
See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2268–70 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(discussing bailments, constructive bailments, and postal mail as potential analogies
for records or data held by third parties).
226
See supra notes 113–117 (discussing Byrd v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1518
(2018)).
227
Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2269, 2270 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Just because
you entrust your data—in some cases, your modern-day papers and effects—to a
third party may not mean you lose any Fourth Amendment interest in its
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CONCLUSION
Like the often-misquoted quip by Mark Twain, the
conventional wisdom’s assessment of the warrant requirement’s
demise is exaggerated.228 So too is the conventional wisdom that
conservative judges favor the police in Fourth Amendment
cases—the various opinions of the justices show it to be a rather
inaccurate predictor of doctrinal positions on the Roberts Court.
Though he dissented in Jardines and McNeely, Chief Justice
Roberts wrote the majority opinions in Riley and Carpenter.229
Justice Alito dissented in Collins as well as Jardines and
McNeely, but wrote Birchfield and concurred in the defendant’s
favor in Jones and Riley.230
Justice Thomas has openly
questioned the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test and
dissented in McNeely and Birchfield, but he also joined all three
of Justice Scalia’s majority opinions in Kyllo, Jones, and
Jardines.231 When the majority in Maryland v. King authorized
the use of DNA samples collected from dangerous felony
arrestees not only for purposes of identification but also for
comparison against archived DNA profiles from unrelated
unsolved crimes, Justice Scalia wrote the strident dissent
insisting that the warrant requirement should apply.232 And
contents . . . . [T]he fact that we store data with third parties may amount to a sort
of involuntary bailment too.”).
228
In 1897, rumors of Twain’s death led him to write to a newspaper reporter,
“[T]he report of my death was an exaggeration.” SHELLEY FISHER FISHKIN,
LIGHTING OUT FOR THE TERRITORY: REFLECTIONS ON MARK TWAIN AND AMERICAN
CULTURE 134 (1996). Twain died in 1910.
229
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2211; Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 377
(2014); Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 166 (2013); Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S.
1, 16 (2013).
230
See Collins v. Virginia, 138 S. Ct. 1663, 1680 (2018); Birchfield v. North
Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2166 (2016); Riley, 573 U.S. at 403; McNeely, 569 U.S. at
166; Jardines, 569 U.S. at 16; Jones v. United States, 565 U.S. 400, 418 (2012). In
Carpenter, Justice Alito also expressed concern that “some of the greatest threats to
individual privacy may come from powerful private companies that collect and
sometimes misuse vast quantities of data about the lives of ordinary Americans” as
well as from governmental data gathering and analysis, and opined that legislation
is the preferable means to address both of these threats. 138 S. Ct. at 2261 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
231
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2236–41, 2244–46 (Thomas, J., dissenting);
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2197 (Thomas, J., dissenting); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 176
(Thomas, J., dissenting); Jardines, 569 U.S. at 2; Jones, 565 U.S. at 401; Kyllo v.
United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
232
See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 482 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Perhaps the construction of such a genetic panopticon is wise. But I doubt that the
proud men who wrote the charter of our liberties would have been so eager to open
their mouths for royal inspection.”). Justice Breyer joined Justice Kennedy’s
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Justice Gorsuch’s separate opinion in Carpenter potentially
suggests an even more rigorous degree of Fourth Amendment
protection for digital data than the majority opinion.233
The Roberts Court’s recent Fourth Amendment decisions
have resulted in a resurgence of the warrant requirement in a
number of contexts, including physical inspections of persons,
papers, and effects as well as location tracking of public
movements by means of data-driven electronic surveillance.
Furthermore, the reasoning in these decisions strongly suggests
that the Court’s holdings will not remain limited to the specific
factual situations of those cases. Though the future development
of the doctrine remains to be seen, the recent decisions viewed as
a whole demonstrate that the Court and its justices take
seriously the necessity of adapting Fourth Amendment doctrine
to the new threats to privacy and liberty posed by police use of
advanced technology and data analytics in the digital age.

majority opinion, also joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and
Alito; Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Justice Scalia’s dissent. See
id. at 438.
233
See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2267–72 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting). Despite this
view, Justice Gorsuch dissented because he concluded the defendant had not
properly preserved the argument, instead relying only on Katz doctrine. See id. at
2272.

